CONSUMER CONSENT OPTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION
EXCHANGE: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND ANALYSIS
March 23, 2010

Prepared for:
Jodi Daniel, JD, MPH, Director
Steven Posnack, MHS, MS, Policy Analyst
Office of Policy and Planning
Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT
200 Independence Avenue, SW, Suite 729D
Washington, DC 20201
Prepared by:
Melissa M. Goldstein, JD
Associate Research Professor
Department of Health Policy, School of Public Health and Health Services
The George Washington University Medical Center
2021 K Street, N.W., Suite 800
Washington, DC 20006
Alison L. Rein, MS
Director
AcademyHealth
1150 17th Street NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
With research assistance from:
Penelope P. Hughes, JD
Julie K. Lappas, JD
Scott A. Weinstein
Benjamin Williams

The content of this white paper does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Office of
the National Coordinator or the Department of Health and Human Services. The authors are
solely responsible for the content.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. ES-1
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................1
Background and Rationale......................................................................................................................................1
The Existing Electronic Health Information Exchange Landscape......................................................................2
CONSENT MODELS: DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION ....................................................................................5
The Five Consent Models .........................................................................................................................................5
No consent............................................................................................................................................................5
Opt-out .................................................................................................................................................................6
Opt-out with exceptions........................................................................................................................................6
Opt-in ...................................................................................................................................................................7
Opt-in with restrictions ........................................................................................................................................7
GRANULARITY AND CHOICE ..............................................................................................................................7
Granularity by Data Type ........................................................................................................................................8
Granularity by Provider...........................................................................................................................................9
Granularity by Time Range ...................................................................................................................................10
Granularity by Purpose..........................................................................................................................................10
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES ....................................................................................................12
State-Led Examples of Exchange in the U.S. .......................................................................................................12
Consent Models Implemented at the State Level ..................................................................................................13
No Consent.........................................................................................................................................................13
Full Opt-Out.......................................................................................................................................................14
Opt-in .................................................................................................................................................................15
Type of Information Exchanged ...........................................................................................................................16
How Information is Used.......................................................................................................................................17
Granularity Options ...............................................................................................................................................19
How Consent Is Obtained ......................................................................................................................................19
Durability of Consent.............................................................................................................................................20
Data Security Oversight and Accountability .........................................................................................................21
Examples of Exchange in Other Developed Countries ........................................................................................22
Canada................................................................................................................................................................22
The Netherlands .................................................................................................................................................22
Sweden...............................................................................................................................................................23
ANALYSIS OF CHOICE MODELS .......................................................................................................................23
Stakeholder Perspectives........................................................................................................................................24
Patients / Consumers .........................................................................................................................................24
Providers............................................................................................................................................................25
Provider Organizations......................................................................................................................................26
GW SPHHS
Department of Health Policy

i

Payer Organizations ..........................................................................................................................................27
HIOs...................................................................................................................................................................27
Policy Makers ....................................................................................................................................................28
Ethical and Cultural Considerations.....................................................................................................................28
Individual Choice and Public Good...................................................................................................................28
Consent in the Privacy Context..........................................................................................................................30
Human Factors ..................................................................................................................................................31
Process, Logistical and Technical Considerations in Obtaining and Managing Consent ..................................34
Who Obtains and Manages Consent ..................................................................................................................34
How Consent is Obtained and Managed............................................................................................................37
LEGAL FRAMEWORK ..........................................................................................................................................40
Federal Law ...........................................................................................................................................................40
HIPAA ................................................................................................................................................................40
A. Elements of the Privacy Rule ...............................................................................................................40
B. Implications for Individual Choice Models .............................................................................................42
GINA ..................................................................................................................................................................44
Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records (Part 2) ...............................................................45
State Laws ..............................................................................................................................................................48
Select State Examples.........................................................................................................................................49
IMPACT OF MODELS ............................................................................................................................................51
Patient Participation ..............................................................................................................................................51
Provider Participation............................................................................................................................................53
Clinical Care ..........................................................................................................................................................54
Quality Improvement, Public Health, and Other Research..................................................................................55
Disparities...............................................................................................................................................................57
METHODS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION...................................................................................................59
Federal Legislative and Regulatory Approach .....................................................................................................59
State-Driven Approach ..........................................................................................................................................61
Voluntary Compliance ...........................................................................................................................................63
Implications............................................................................................................................................................64
RECOMMENDATIONS / CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................................................66
APPENDIX A.......................................................................................................................................................... A-1
APPENDIX B...........................................................................................................................................................B-1
APPENDIX C.......................................................................................................................................................... C-1

GW SPHHS
Department of Health Policy

ii

CONSUMER CONSENT OPTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION
EXCHANGE: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND ANALYSIS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The issue of whether, to what extent, and how individuals should have the ability to exercise
control over their health information represents one of the foremost policy challenges related to
the electronic exchange of health information. The current landscape of possible consent models
is varied, and the factors involved in choosing among them are complex. States and other
entities engaged in facilitating the exchange of electronic health information are struggling with
a host of challenges, chief among them the establishment of policies and procedures for patient
participation in their exchange efforts. While some have adopted policies enabling patients to
exercise individual choice, others have prioritized the needs and concerns of other key
stakeholders, such as providers and payers. The purpose of this paper is to discuss in detail the
issues, nuanced considerations, and possible tradeoffs associated with the various consent
options to help facilitate informed decision making.
Core consent options (abbreviated) for electronic exchange include the following:






No consent. Health information of patients is automatically included—patients cannot
opt out;
Opt-out. Default is for health information of patients to be included automatically, but
the patient can opt out completely;
Opt-out with exceptions. Default is for health information of patients to be included, but
the patient can opt out completely or allow only select data to be included;
Opt-in. Default is that no patient health information is included; patients must actively
express consent to be included, but if they do so then their information must be all in or
all out; and
Opt-in with restrictions. Default is that no patient health information is made available,
but the patient may allow a subset of select data to be included.

As these definitions illustrate, a range of consent models can be applied in different contexts of
electronic exchange in the U.S., and it is possible for there to be further permutations depending
on the level of choice granularity allowed. There is also considerable variation in the type of
information exchanged, ranging from the more basic (e.g., lab results) to the more mature and
complex (e.g., a wide array of health information).
The consent model selected for electronic exchange, as well as the determination of which types
of health information to exchange, affects many stakeholders (e.g., patients, providers, and
payers). These decisions also have consequences for national policy goals, such as improving
the quality of healthcare, promoting public health, engaging patients in their health care, and
ensuring the privacy and security of personal health information. This discussion requires not
only an appreciation of the sometimes competing interests of various stakeholders, but also
consideration of the interests of the individual relative to those of society as a whole.
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Provider and patient participation in electronic exchange have been identified as key
challenges—both patient and provider participation are desired to facilitate better care delivery
and advance other societal goals (e.g., improved public health), as well as to ensure the viability
and utility of the exchange. To enhance patient participation, numerous electronic exchanges
have employed one or more of the following tactics:





Active engagement of patients in the development of the exchange entity;
Vigorous marketing of exchange efforts through effective channels;
Initial and ongoing education (largely from providers) about the effort; and
Adoption of an opt-out or no-consent model, in concert with tight restrictions on data
access and / or use, including stringent penalties for misuse.

In addition, these electronic exchanges have employed the following methods of ensuring
adequate provider participation:




Minimization of administrative burdens, sometimes coupled with financial or other
incentives;
Maximization of value (i.e., access to as much useful information as possible, as often as
is needed); and
Provision of key infrastructure and service components (e.g., a record locator service or
consent management tool).

Other issues of particular significance with regard to progress (or lack thereof) toward the greater
proliferation of electronic exchange include:






Numerous and sometimes inconsistent federal and state laws regarding patient consent
generally, and disclosure of sensitive information specifically;
Provider workflow challenges associated with obtaining and managing consent;
The lack of (or difficulty in achieving) technical and procedural capacity to segment and
manage data in the manners desired by various constituents;
The concern that existing security and privacy provisions are inadequate; and
The need to balance multiple and often conflicting stakeholder interests to ensure
adequate participation.

At present, the evidence from emerging electronic exchanges is insufficient to determine the
consequences associated with policy decisions that allow for greater or lesser levels of patient
choice with regard to the electronic exchange of their data. There are early signs that consent
models at both ends of the spectrum can generate sufficient patient and provider participation to
achieve the critical mass necessary for system function and the realization of key goals.
However, in any consent model the role of other factors, such as the accompanying level of
dedicated human and financial resources, policy development, and other necessary supports,
must also be considered. Due to the complexity of issues involved in selecting and applying a
particular consent model, appropriate guidance in the form of higher-level principles or
recommendations is critical to moving forward. While this document represents a starting point
for discussion related to consent, it is imperative that future deliberations are informed by further
research regarding the effectiveness and impact of various consent options, consideration of the
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broader policy landscape, and assessment of the needs of those most affected by the consent
decision. Until the time when we are confident that we can protect health information in a
systematic and thorough way, prudent use of the mechanism of consent appears to be one of the
most reliable ways to pursue that goal.
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CONSUMER CONSENT OPTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH
INFORMATION EXCHANGE: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND
ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION
Background and Rationale
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act (Division
A, Title XIII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)) 1 directs the Office of
the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) to oversee the development
of a health information technology (HIT) infrastructure that “improves health care quality,
reduces medical errors, reduces health disparities, and advances the delivery of patient-centered
medical care.” 2 This charge sets a course for the U.S. health care system to transform the way it
operates fundamentally by leveraging twenty-first century technologies. It is widely recognized
that this is no small task—in part because legal, technical, cultural, economic and policy
considerations must be addressed before HIT can be fully leveraged to achieve anticipated
quality and efficiency gains.
One immediate challenge for policy makers is the daunting task of urging health care providers
to adopt and demonstrate “meaningful use” 3 of HIT systems. It is for this reason that incentives
for the acquisition and use of such technologies were built into the HITECH Act. 4 However,
technology acquisition is clearly not the ultimate goal. It is widely believed that the vision of
better patient care will not be achieved unless these systems are used to support the delivery of
patient-centered care, which requires that relevant information about patients can be accessed
and used whenever, wherever, and by whomever it is needed. This vision calls for true data
liquidity and means that information exchange must overcome entrenched institutional, legal,
cultural, and business boundaries as well as some technical obstacles.
It is also widely acknowledged that, if we are to reap the benefits of information exchange,
patients must be assured that appropriate technology solutions, business practices, and policy
protections will be employed to prevent their information from being used in undesirable ways or
to generally impinge upon their rights and civil liberties. As communicated in a recent message
from Dr. David Blumenthal, National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, “We must
have comprehensive, clear, and sustainable policies that strengthen existing protections, fill gaps
as they emerge, fortify new opportunities for patients’ access to and control of their information,
and align with evolving technologies.” 5

1

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13101-13424, 123 Stat. 115, 228-279
(2009).
2
§ 13101, 123 Stat. at 230 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 300jj-11 (West 2009)).
3
§ 4101(a), 123 Stat. at 467-477 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4 (West 2009)).
4
§§ 4101-4201, 123 Stat. at 467-494.
5
Blumenthal, D. "Coordinator's Corner: Updates from Dr. Blumenthal," November 12, 2009. Available at:
http://www.healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=1406&parentname=CommunityPage&parentid=0&
mode=2&in_hi_userid=10741&cached=true.
GW SPHHS
Department of Health Policy

1

To accomplish the goals envisioned by Congress, and fully leverage the benefits of an HITenabled health care system, we face several fundamental policy challenges. This whitepaper
presents a discussion of the issues associated with whether, and if so how, to obtain individual
consent 6 for the purposes of electronic health information exchange. Years of policy
deliberations at the state and federal level have proven that this is a difficult issue to resolve—in
part because of economic, technical, cultural, and legal considerations, but also because the
various stakeholders involved disagree, often strenuously, on the best approach. Determining
when and how an individual’s consent should be obtained for electronic health information
exchange is a complicated policy decision that requires consideration of a number of complex
issues and a determination of how to balance the needs of the participants in the exchange along
with desired societal outcomes.
The Existing Electronic Health Information Exchange Landscape
Broadly speaking, the goal of electronic health information exchange (from here on simply
referred to as electronic exchange) is to facilitate the sharing and use of health-related
information in order to enable safe, timely, efficient, effective, equitable, and patient-centered
care. At present, most electronic exchange efforts focus primarily on use of information for
clinical care purposes. This focus partly reflects the immediate and high-priority goal of
improving patient care through wide availability of relevant clinical information. It also is likely
a function of the fact that, as discussed later in this paper, the privacy regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and many
state laws allow for the exchange of most health information for specified purposes (treatment
foremost among them) without patient 7 consent. However, organizations that engage in
electronic exchange do not always exercise this option—even when the states’ legal framework
would permit the exchange of clinical information for treatment purposes without first obtaining
patient consent. This practice is largely due to an acknowledgement that, in order to achieve any
level of systemic durability and success, electronic exchange efforts must establish trust
relationships with all participants, including patients.
At present, a number of technical, legal, policy, cultural, and business challenges are impeding
progress toward these goals. Despite – or perhaps because of – these challenges, numerous and
often differing examples of electronic exchange are evident across the country. The level of
complexity associated with electronic exchange can vary depending on a host of factors,
including but not limited to: 1) the number of parties involved in electronic exchange and their
relationships with one another; 2) the purposes for which the information is being exchanged; 3)
6

For the purposes of this paper, we use the term “consent” generally to refer to patient permission to include
personal health information in and / or exchange it through electronic exchange. The HIPAA Privacy Rule
(discussed later in this paper) requires an “authorization” for uses and disclosures of protected health information
that are not otherwise permitted or required. An “authorization” is a detailed written document defined by the Rule
that gives covered entities permission to use or disclose protected health information (PHI) for specified purposes.
We use the term “authorization” in this paper when referring to the requirements of the Privacy Rule or other
specific laws (e.g., the New York Public Health Law, Rhode Island Health Information Exchange Act of 2008).
7
Although the terms "patient" and "consumer" are sometimes used interchangeably, for the purposes of this paper
we generally use the word "patient" to mean a person who is engaged in the process of expressing his or her
preferences (typically in a care setting or context) with respect to the inclusion in and / or exchange of his / her
health information through electronic exchange. We use the word "consumer" in particular contexts, such as
"consumer participation" in focus groups or "consumer groups."
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the nature of the information being exchanged and the existence of technical standards to support
its exchange; 4) the maturity of the exchange system; and (5) the rules and policies applied to the
organizations involved and information being exchanged. For these and other reasons, some
electronic exchange efforts can be characterized as more basic (e.g., very limited data are
electronically exchanged between few entities in a small geographic region) or more
sophisticated (e.g., many types of data are electronically exchanged between multiple providers
in more than one state).
The U.S. electronic exchange landscape also reflects great diversity in the governance and
architectural models applied. Some electronic exchange efforts lack a formal, centralized
governance structure – preferring instead to distribute responsibilities among participating
organizations without designating a central authority. Others establish formal public-private
collaboratives that direct and coordinate efforts for one or more electronic exchanges. The
former tend to be associated with smaller-scale efforts, and the latter with larger and more
complicated structures, such as those undertaken at the state level.
Toward the more “basic” end of the spectrum are exchange efforts that leverage their existing
relationships to send or “push” information from one point to another, often adding new
technology components (e.g., Electronic Health Records (EHRs)) to do so. Generally speaking,
this “push” approach makes electronic exchange (versus paper) the dominant model of point-topoint information sharing from one provider or other partnering entity to another (i.e., Dr. Smith
sends clinical data on patient Sue electronically (versus via fax) to Dr. Jones). At present, these
point-to-point approaches to electronic exchange are more common, as they typically can
facilitate early exchange efforts without significant infrastructure investment and the key
elements are more readily available and culturally more similar to the current information flow
paradigm. It has also been suggested that perhaps even the policy considerations involved in
these types of electronic exchange might be less complicated to implement than alternative
methods.
On the other end of the spectrum is the “pull” approach to electronic exchange (which is
typically associated with larger, networked, and more structured exchange efforts, such as those
undertaken at the state level). These often involve the creation of a shared architecture and
supporting services that enable a more sophisticated capacity to search for and extract - or “pull”
- electronic data from one or more networked sources using a query system, and may or may not
require the presence of an existing relationship between the requesting entity and the data holder.
Regardless of where a particular electronic exchange effort falls on the governance and / or
architecture spectrum, certain key functions need to be undertaken by participating
organizations. These include the establishment of a policy framework, development and
management of contractual conventions and terms, determination of the means of exchange and
data to be exchanged, and development and maintenance of exchange standards. Typically, the
participating organizations reflect some combination of providers, payers, and health agencies.
While many entities engaging in “push” versions of electronic exchange are able to share
responsibility for these functions across the participating organizations, larger and / or more
sophisticated efforts tend to require the establishment of an external, coordinating entity. The
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entities most commonly associated with this function are Health Information Organizations
(HIOs), 8 which have emerged as technical, governance, and oversight structures that facilitate
the exchange of health-related information among participating organizations. Sometimes these
entities focus primarily on administrative data exchange but, for the purposes of this work, we
have considered only those that enable electronic exchange of clinical data.
HIOs can operate at the state or other geographically defined level, but often reflect collaboration
based on service orientation, patient population, or strategic business interest. A number of other
factors may influence the scale and scope of an HIO, as well as its likelihood of achieving
success. These include:
1. The number and types of entities participating (or committed to participating) in
electronic exchange of clinical data;
2. The variety of types of data being exchanged;
3. Whether electronic exchange is focused on exchanging data for a specific population
(e.g., just Medicaid patients);
4. Whether the participants have a history of prior collaboration; and / or
5. The level and sources of revenue available to the HIO (both in the formative phases and
ongoing). 9
At any given time, varying numbers of HIOs are reported to be active in the U.S., and many
other less formalized exchange efforts exist across the country. Given the multiple and diverse
examples in the U.S., it is not surprising that approaches for managing patient consent are
equally so. In a later section, we provide several examples of how different states (and some
differently defined HIOs) have approached this issue and what is unique about each approach.
Other vehicles for electronic exchange are continuing to emerge, including some that do not
require the creation of a new governance entity and / or a reliance on underlying HIT systems
from which to extract the data intended for electronic exchange. For the purposes of this
whitepaper, we focus primarily on the common challenge of how to deal with the issue of
consent, and less on the specific context or environment in which this and related decisions are
made. A number of the specific examples of electronic exchange referenced throughout this
paper are based on our review of state-led efforts, but this is primarily a function of there being
more information available and transparency surrounding the decisions made at this level.
Undoubtedly, there are lessons to be gleaned from smaller and / or less formalized exchange
endeavors, but these examples were not as evident or readily accessible.
While there is relatively little quantifiable information available as to whether and to what extent
patients involved in electronic exchange would differentiate between more or less complex
efforts (as referenced above), it is reasonable to assume that several factors might influence that
8

As used in this paper, the term “HIO” means an organization that oversees and governs the exchange of healthrelated information. See The National Alliance for Health Information Technology, Report to the Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology on Defining Key Health Information Technology Terms,
April 28, 2008.
9
Adler-Milstein, J. et al. “Characteristics Associated with Regional Health Information Organization Viability.
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 61-65.
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perspective. For example, a reasonable hypothesis might be that electronic exchanges that are
fairly limited in scope or scale (e.g., exchange of lab information between a hospital and large
group practice) might present less of a threat or reason for concern among participating patients
than would electronic exchanges that integrate numerous types of patient information from
multiple sources and make it broadly available for care and / or other purposes. Specific factors
would likely include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The types of information included in the exchange;
The nature and number of entities granted access to that information;
The purpose(s) for which the exchanged information could be used;
The perceived value of the electronic exchange to the patient; and
The extent of protections and remedies in place should one of the above conditions be
compromised.

These and other issues often require decisions that take into account the particular laws that
govern the use and disclosure of health information in the state in which they are chartered or
operating.
CONSENT MODELS: DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION
This whitepaper is intended both to frame and describe some of the major policy, legal, cultural,
practical, and other challenges associated with selecting consent models for electronic exchange,
and also to serve as a decision aid for policy makers and stakeholders alike. Based on our review
of various forms of electronic exchange in the U.S., as well as other sources in the public
domain, we have determined that there are five core consent models. Provided below is a
definition of each, along with some additional contextual information. These consent models are
presented in order from “lowest” to “highest” in terms of reflecting the extent to which consumer
preferences are integrated and accommodated.
It is important to note that the models are intended to apply to participation in a networked
electronic exchange effort and are not intended to imply constraints to the usual transmission –
paper or electronic – of information for treatment, payment, or health care operations purposes as
permitted under HIPAA and other relevant federal and state laws. Also relevant is the fact that
these models may be combined within the same exchange environment. An example of this is the
situation where one consent model applies to the inclusion of information in a network and
another model applies to the ability of the provider and other allowed participants to gain access
to that information via the exchange.
The Five Consent Models
No consent
This model provides no opportunity for accommodation of individual preference with respect to
participation in electronic exchange, so the health information of patients under the care of a
participating provider organization is automatically included in and available (often according to
certain rules) through the exchange. This model is typically found in states that require no
additional provisions for the electronic exchange of health information beyond the federal floor
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set by the HIPAA privacy regulations. In these states, electronic exchange can take place
irrespective of and without obtaining patient preferences for participation (within the bounds of
applicable federal and state laws). Not all HIOs with this authority exercise it, but no consent
should be considered as an option in the spectrum.
One interesting permutation of this approach is the possible requirement that patients be notified
of their participation in the exchange and educated as to what the exchange does, how the
information is used, and what purpose(s) it serves. Another possible version of this model
provides no opportunity for accommodation of individual preference with respect to participation
in electronic exchange (meaning that all data flow into the exchange), but does require that
patients be afforded the opportunity to exercise consent for making the information available for
any purpose not already permitted by law (e.g., public health surveillance). This means that
while patients would have no ability to constrain the flow of their information into the system,
they would have some authority to determine how (e.g., by whom, under what circumstances) it
can be used. It should be noted that this concept may also be applied to the opt-in model
described later in this section.
Opt-out
In an opt-out model, the default is for all or some pre-defined set of data (e.g., labs, summary
record information) to be eligible automatically for exchange, with a provision that patients must
be given the opportunity to opt out in full. In a typical opt-out scenario, this could mean either
that the information of the patient who opts out is collected through the exchange (and used only
for legally permitted purposes, such as public health reporting), but never shared with other
providers for clinical care, or that the patient’s preferences are captured and propagated such that
his / her clinical information never even enters the exchange. Regardless of where in the system
the information exchange is blocked, this option allows for no granularity of patient preference,
meaning that a patient’s information is either all in or all out. Many electronic exchange models
with the legal authority to adopt the no consent approach ultimately end up using an opt-out
approach instead.
Opt-out with exceptions
In an opt-out with exceptions model, the default is that all or some pre-defined set of data types
are eligible for exchange, but patients can either opt out in full (as described above), or: 1)
selectively exclude categories of data / specific data elements from the exchange; 2) limit
exchange of their information to specific providers / provider organizations; and / or 3) limit
exchange of their information for specific purposes. The trade-off with this level of patient
accommodation is that it is technically and procedurally more complex to administer and
manage. Very few electronic exchange models have allowed for full granularity in the choice of
data type exchanged, but some have allowed patient choice as to which provider types may gain
access to their data via the exchange. Granularity of exchange at the individual provider level is
procedurally more complicated and could pose additional management challenges. For these and
other reasons, it has rarely been implemented. Most entities engaging in electronic exchange
have not yet attempted to allow granularity with regard to purpose specification, as very few are
currently using the information for purposes other than clinical care delivery and public health.
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Opt-in
In an opt-in model, the default is that no patient data are automatically made available for
electronic exchange. Patients wishing to make all, or a pre-defined set, of their information
available must actively express their desire to participate. This option allows for no granularity
of patient preference—meaning that a patient’s information is either all in or all out. Once
participating, patients who opt in have no control over what information is shared, how, with
whom, or for what purpose. The only exceptions here are: 1) permission is later revoked by the
patient; or 2) other protections extend to the data (e.g., marketing provisions in the HIPAA
privacy regulations).
Opt-in with restrictions
In an opt-in with restrictions model, the default is that no patient data are automatically made
available for electronic exchange. Patients wishing to make all, or a pre-defined set, of their
information available for exchange must actively grant their consent to participate. They then
have the option to make all of their information eligible for exchange or: 1) include only specific
categories of data or / data elements; 2) enable information to flow only to specific providers;
and / or 3) allow their information to be exchanged only for specific purposes.
In theory, each of these discrete consent models represents a cleanly-delineated option for how
patient consent could be approached for electronic exchange. In practice, however, there are as
many choice model permutations as entities that participate in electronic exchange. Each entity
(regardless of scale) encounters who, what, why, and when decisions, and resolves them based
on its own unique set of legal, cultural, political, and other contextual circumstances. This
variability forces us to consider a more nuanced picture. Additionally, even though the above
consent categories appear to be mutually exclusive, some electronic exchange systems have
flexible enough policy frameworks such that they can permit multiple consent models to coexist. One example of this occurs in those utilizing opt-out models that, in order to
accommodate an array of provider preferences, have permitted provider entities to make their
own determinations as to whether the patients under their care are required to give affirmative
consent (i.e., opt in) even when not dictated by the general policies for participation in electronic
exchange.
GRANULARITY AND CHOICE
In numerous ways, and for a variety of reasons, patients participating in electronic exchange may
prefer to:
1. Exert some control over the type and level of information that can be shared;
2. Restrict information accessed via electronic exchange to a limited (and potentially
specified) set of individuals or entities;
3. Establish preferences for the time frame and / or duration for which their information
could be accessed via electronic exchange; and / or
4. Specify – either broadly or specifically – the various purposes for which their
information accessed via electronic exchange could be used.
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A person’s rationale for desiring this level of control may stem from concern or fear for how the
information available through electronic exchange could be perceived or used, a personal
preference for privacy, or his / her individual values. Whatever the reason, it is important to
acknowledge and respect those concerns upfront so appropriate steps can be taken to advance the
goal of health information exchange while still respecting fundamental autonomy and values. In
the health care context, however, it is important to acknowledge the consequences associated
both with enabling and choosing not to prioritize individual autonomy—many of them
undesirable or unintended, or both.
Granularity by Data Type
One of the most commonly discussed issues in the context of electronic exchange is whether
patients should be able to block specific data elements (e.g., a recent lab test), 10 or categories of
data (e.g., all medications) from being exchanged electronically. This idea is referred to as
granularity by data type. The advantages of this approach are relative, and depend considerably
on one’s perspective. Patient and consumer advocates, and very often consumers themselves
(when asked), indicate a preference for having some choice in this matter and suggest that such a
provision would increase their trust / willingness to participate in electronic exchange. 11
However, providers and those responsible for implementing electronic exchange tend to view
this level of control in a less positive light, partly for reasons related to the perceived difficulty of
administering and then incorporating processes for accommodating this level of control into their
workflow. In addition, most providers have expressed a strong preference to have complete (or
as complete as possible) clinical information available to facilitate the provision of high quality
care, and also to mitigate liability issues. They also argue that enabling patients to segregate
potentially important data from other clinical information inhibits the provision of coordinated
care and perpetuates the lack of integration between mental and physical health. One possible
exception to this trend is seen in the case of psychiatrists and other behavioral and mental health
providers, who may be more reluctant to share clinical data because they are sympathetic to the
concerns of their patients about how such information could be used (e.g., to discriminate, deny
insurance coverage, etc.). 12
In seeking a compromise solution for this challenge, it has been suggested that it should be
possible to pre-define (for the purpose of sequestering from electronic exchange) specific
categories of information that are likely to be considered as sensitive by individual patients.
What we know from experience, however, is that sensitivity is subjective. For example, while
some patients may have very few reservations about making their imaging results available to all
of their providers, a victim of domestic violence may not want that same type of information to
be shared beyond the system of the treating facility.
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See Purington, K. et al. Electronic Release of Clinical Laboratory Results: A Review of State and Federal Policy.
Prepared for: California HealthCare Foundation, January 2010 at 2. Available at:
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Despite the reluctance to define specific categories of data for the purpose of restricting
electronic exchange, this is exactly what has resulted from both federal and state laws that
govern the flow of sensitive information, 13 such as substance abuse, mental health, and HIV
diagnoses. In this case, however, it is the presence / interpretation of the law, and not the
individual patient, that has restricted the flow of such information. Most electronic exchange
models expressly exclude the exchange of sensitive information, and do so because they: 1) do
not know how to interpret the various federal and state policies and regulations that apply to
sensitive information; 2) have not yet determined how best to handle the technical and
procedural challenges associated with data segmentation; and / or 3) wish to establish a basic
level of trust before exchanging information considered “sensitive.”
Given this environment, the question has been posed as to whether it is possible to define a set of
eligible data for near-term exchange (i.e., low hanging fruit) that would enable incremental
progress. What most have settled on is: 1) a conservative (i.e., more limited) interpretation of the
federal and state laws related to the exchange of sensitive health information; and 2) a
determination of what is reasonable and procedurally and technically feasible to implement.
This process has led many entities to a “next best” granularity approach that allows patients to
exert some control, not over which data are shared via the exchange, but with whom.
Granularity by Provider
One way of addressing consumer concern about electronic exchange is to restrict information
access to only those providers approved by the patient. This method is referred to as granularity
of consent by provider. There are three main approaches for how this can be handled:
1. The patient is given the option to permit access to only specific individual providers;
2. The patient is given the option to permit access to only specific provider or staff types
(e.g., all MDs and RNs could be granted access, but not office staff); or
3. The patient is given the option to restrict access at the provider entity level (e.g., primary
care and cardiology practices are granted access, but the allergist is not).
As with granularity by data type, the benefit of provider granularity is not perceived equally
across stakeholders. While patients may view the option as a way both to retain some level of
control and ensure that only those providers they deem appropriate are eligible, many of the
provider and governance entity concerns mentioned above would apply. From a provider
perspective, coordination of care may be compromised by their inability to get “the full picture”
of a given patient. This holds true both for those providers with and those without access to a
patient’s information via electronic exchange—the former because they have only part of the
picture, and the latter because they only have access to the information that resides within their
own record.

13

See, e.g., Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records (“Part 2”), 42 C.F.R. pt. 2 (2009); New
York laws governing disclosure of HIV-related information, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 2010);
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Granularity by Time Range
Another possible, though rarely applied, granularity option involves the inclusion or exclusion of
information based on the time / date associated with an element of clinical data. Theoretically,
this method could be handled in a number of different ways, and used for a variety of reasons.
Possible examples include:
1. An entity engaging in electronic exchange could make the determination that it is only
necessary to have the most recent clinical information available to providers and other
partners via electronic exchange. In this case, provider access could be restricted to only
the most recent year (or two or three) of clinical data, and perhaps more direct patient
consent could be required to release “older” information;
2. An entity engaging in electronic exchange could allow patients to apply a time range
restriction that corresponds to specific episodes of care that may be particularly
“sensitive’ in nature (e.g., a month spent in a rehabilitation clinic). In this case, provider
access to all other clinical information on the patient could be allowed, but any clinical
information recorded between X and Y dates would be blocked out; and / or
3. An entity engaging in electronic exchange could institute specific time-sensitive “use
cases” that enable information access only for a certain period of time. A specific
example that has been widely discussed and implemented by more than one entity is the
“break the glass” provision, which is intended to enable access to clinical information
only for a brief time (typically 24 hours) in order for providers to treat patients in
emergency situations. This method also requires definition of a “purpose specification,”
and would therefore involve applying multiple layers of granularity in practice.
Each of the examples above might reflect an attempt to address the needs of multiple
stakeholders. They also require consideration of the potential drawbacks associated with
granularity of this type. Patients with a long medical history and / or chronic conditions, for
example, may not be well served by limiting electronic exchange to only the most recent year of
data, and the value of the data would be diminished from a public health and research
perspective as well. Conversely, a failure to offer individuals some level of choice may lead
certain patients to stop seeking care altogether, or to seek care only if they can pay out-of-pocket.
It should also be noted that any of these time stamp permutations can be – and often are –
combined with other granularity provisions.
Granularity by Purpose
A fourth granularity category involves segmentation according to the intended use or specified
purpose for which data can be accessed via electronic exchange. With this type of consent,
patients would have the option to consider all possible uses of their information that is available
via electronic exchange (e.g., care delivery, quality improvement, clinical research, health
services research), and then determine which uses would be acceptable to them (i.e., consent to
use of information for specified purposes only). Of course, the latitude that any particular patient
would have to deny use of his / her information for treatment purposes would be subject to the
laws of the relevant state and consent model policies established for the particular electronic
exchange. The same would hold true for other purposes that may not require a patient’s consent,
such as public health surveillance.
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The primary appeal of granularity by purpose is that, assuming patients choose to consent to
allow their information to be used for treatment purposes, and unless this choice is coupled with
other granularity options, it enables all relevant clinical information to be made available via
electronic exchange. From a provider perspective, as well as that of the patient who prioritizes
highly-coordinated care, this method could alleviate concerns about incomplete or missing data
that can jeopardize the goal of improving patient care. This approach, standing alone, also
diminishes the technical and procedural concerns that arise with some of the other granularity
options (e.g., granularity by data type).
From the patient perspective, one advantage of this approach is that it affords some level of
choice and perhaps the ability to help support (through allowance of data use) certain activities
that are highly valued by that individual. For example, patients with a family history of cancer
may be particularly inclined to make their data available for clinical research purposes in that
field. Conversely, patients with significant privacy concerns could choose to deny access to their
information for any or a particular purpose, and could also require more information or
explanation for proposed uses on a case-by-case basis. To the extent that this method presents an
opportunity for patients to gain a better understanding of how and why their information might
be used, the process of participating in such discussions regarding consent could also help to
foster greater understanding and engagement.
That said, this option does little to address the needs of patients who would prefer to have most
of their information available for treatment or other purposes, but wish to deny access to a
specified subset of providers or reduce availability of any information they deem too sensitive.
Furthermore, granting patients the ability to restrict access in this manner potentially reduces the
total volume of information available for a variety of possible purposes, particularly those that
are less understood and / or less likely to gain patient approval.
General public perception may also be a factor in selecting choice options. Implementing
nationwide electronic exchange of health information, particularly for uses other than treatment,
may be perceived by segments of the population as inappropriate corporate or governmental
intrusion. It has been suggested that these concerns may be somewhat mitigated by permitting
some degree of patient choice as to whether to participate in such a system.
One final but critically important consideration regarding this option is that the process of
defining and describing possible uses of information in electronic exchange may pose a
significant challenge. This issue is evident in the difficulty that various stakeholders have had
interpreting the purview of the HIPAA privacy regulations, which generally permit the exchange
of protected health information for treatment, payment, and health care operations. 14 The first
two domains are fairly straightforward and are generally supported by patients and providers,
who rely on them for care delivery and payment reasons. Numerous polls have found that
patients either already presume that their clinical information is shared with their health care
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providers as needed, or overwhelmingly support such information sharing to support their care. 15
It therefore seems unlikely that many patients would choose to restrict access to their clinical
information for such purposes. Further, though patients likely do not fully appreciate the extent
to which or reasons why their information must be shared for payment purposes, most (except
perhaps those who either do or would wish to pay out-of-pocket for select products and services)
understand that such information sharing is a pre-condition of reimbursement. The health care
operations element, however, is very open ended, and has been more difficult for stakeholders to
interpret in an evolving health care landscape. 16 Any future efforts to define categories of use
should try to incorporate lessons learned from this experience.
Each of these granularity options presents certain advantages and drawbacks. A common theme,
however, is that the provision of patient choice comes at a cost —sometimes borne by providers,
sometimes by electronic exchange governance entities, and sometimes by third parties who wish
to use the information for research or other purposes. Conversely, a failure to offer individuals
some level of choice may lead certain patients to seek care only if they can pay out-of-pocket or
to stop seeking care altogether, and could have serious consequences for patient engagement in
health and health care more generally.
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES
Because health care improvement and efficiency gains are needed in many countries, and given
that HIT and electronic exchange are widely believed to support these goals, a variety of models
for electronic exchange exist throughout the world. As this section will highlight, the U.S. is not
the only country to have struggled with the issue of patient consent in the context of electronic
exchange. Countries that have implemented HIT systems have experienced varying degrees of
success in leveraging them for the purpose of sharing health information electronically among
relevant stakeholders. By examining examples of individual choice models currently used in the
U.S. and other countries, the relative benefits of various approaches as well as their critical
issues and challenges can be considered. While the sections that follow offer some important
illustrative examples, they are not intended to be exhaustive or fully representative of the
electronic exchange landscape.
State-Led Examples of Exchange in the U.S. – (See Appendix A)
In their efforts to maximize the benefits of HIT, numerous states and state-designated entities
(SDEs) have worked to establish mechanisms for electronic exchange, many of them formalized
as HIOs. An analysis of the various approaches to consent at the state level reveals great
similarity in the awareness of core challenges, but vast differences in how these issues are
addressed and resolved by each exchange effort. Through numerous conversations with
individuals working at the state level, and additional research on individual exchange efforts, we
have gained insight into the possible reasons for selecting one consent model over another.
15
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Based on a variety of factors (e.g., state laws, funding availability, and leadership capacity), the
technical architecture, governance structure, and policy decisions vary significantly from one
exchange effort to the next. Not surprisingly, approaches to handling patient consent also vary
significantly.
Some state laws, for example, do not require patient consent for the exchange of health
information beyond that required by federal law, enabling HIOs in those states to implement a no
consent model. Other states’ laws, such as those in New York, contain explicit patient privacy
protections, 17 and have led to implementation of an opt-in model of exchange. State exchanges
also vary in their accommodation of various stakeholders. Some state HIOs, such as Delaware’s
Health Information Exchange (DHIN), have designed their exchanges primarily to support the
needs and interests of the provider community. Other states, such as Washington, afford patients
a more active role in determining what, how, and with whom their health information can be
shared by designing their exchange programs with consumer choice as a more pronounced goal.
Drawing from the experiences of HIOs in eight states, this section provides an overview of the
range of choice models in operation at the state level today, along with examples of how they
define core elements of their exchange efforts. The section includes comparisons of the types of
information exchanged, the purposes for which information can be used, the processes by which
consent is obtained and managed (who and how), and the durability of consent. In reviewing the
activities in these states, we have identified examples of: No consent, Opt-out, Opt-in, and Opt-in
with restrictions, many of which co-exist within the same exchange but are applied differently
depending on specific conditions. We also have included some discussion of a health record
bank approach underway in the State of Washington.
Consent Models Implemented at the State Level
No Consent
The legal landscape in Indiana and Delaware has enabled HIOs in both states to apply no consent
policies to their electronic exchange efforts—the Indiana Health Information Exchange (IHIE)
and the DHIN, respectively. In Indiana, no patient consent is needed for the exchange of health
information under state law. IHIE has therefore chosen not to require express patient consent
for participation in the exchange. 18 However, federally-funded substance abuse treatment
programs covered by the federal Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records
regulations (Part 2) 19 do not provide data to IHIE. 20 In Delaware, the results delivery function 21
17

New York laws governing disclosure of HIV-related information, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney
2010); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 63.5(a) (2009).
18
Email from Victoria Prescott, CEO of McBroom Consulting, December 23, 2009.
19
42 C.F.R. pt. 2 (2009). These regulations were promulgated pursuant to the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-616, 84 Stat. 1848, and the Drug
Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 65. The rulemaking authority granted by both
statutes relating to confidentiality of records can now be found at 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006). For more
information on Part 2 in the context of electronic exchange, see Legal Framework section.
20
Email from Victoria Prescott, supra note 18.
21
DHIN’s results delivery function allows physicians to receive electronically a patient’s clinical lab and radiology
results, medication history, and discharge summaries. See Matthews, T. Health Bridge: Transforming Health Care
Through Connectivity and Collaboration PowerPoint Presentation, February 19, 2010. Available at:
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of DHIN also operates under a no consent model, meaning that a variety of patient data are
included in the exchange without the provision of express consent. 22
In selecting its individual choice model for the results delivery function, Delaware policy makers
prioritized the needs and concerns of the provider community, essentially minimizing the
likelihood that patient information would be “missing” from the exchange in the event that
consent was not granted. As a result, provider participation in the DHIN is high, and a
significant portion of eligible records are available through the exchange. Since going live in
2007, DHIN’s results delivery function automatically uploads a patient’s laboratory data,
radiology reports, and hospital admissions, discharge, and transfer data to the DHIN system at
the point of care without patient consent. 23 As of December 2009, over 85 percent of all
laboratory transactions in the state were available through DHIN, and more than 80 percent of
hospitalizations were captured. 24
Full Opt-Out
By contrast, the patient query function of DHIN’s system operates as an opt-out model. This
function allows providers to query the system to obtain specific data on a particular patient. 25
While they have no choice in the matter of whether their information is available through the
exchange, patients can choose to opt out of the query function, thus barring any provider seeking
to access their information via the exchange from doing so without first obtaining the patient’s
consent. 26 Again, however, DHIN has chosen to maximize the availability of health information
to the provider community by making it somewhat difficult for patients to exercise this opt-out
option. To opt out of the DHIN system, a patient must have an approval form signed by his or
her provider or a notary public (to validate identity), and then return the form to DHIN. 27
Although DHIN makes it the provider’s responsibility to educate a patient about the policies,
practices, and rationale for the exchange, including the procedure for opting out, no one in the
State of Delaware has yet exercised the right to deny access to their information via the
exchange. 28 DHIN’s approach raises questions as to whether patients in Delaware are truly
aware of the exchange and, if so, how well they understand the purpose of the exchange, the
actors involved, the potential uses of their information, and their rights.

22

The Commonwealth Fund. Delaware: First State, First Statewide Health Information Exchange in “States in
Action: October/November 2009.” Available at: http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Newsletters/States-inAction/2009/November/October-November-2009/Snapshots/Delaware.aspx; Phone call with Sarah Matthews, Vice
President of Client Services, Advances in Management, Inc., December 3, 2009. Delaware does not have a general
health information law, meaning that most information may be disclosed in accordance with HIPAA, but does
statutorily require providers to obtain patient permission to disclose the results of an HIV test. Del. Code Ann. tit. 16
§ 1203(a)(2),(3),(4) (2008); Pritts, J., et al. Privacy and Security Solutions for Interoperable Health Information
Exchange: Report on State Law Requirements for Patient Permission to Disclose Health Information, August 2009,
at 4-3, n. 72. Available at:
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Another example of an opt-out exchange is the Chesapeake Regional Information System for
Our Patients (CRISP) in Maryland. CRISP currently has two operational pilot programs: 1) an
exchange of medication history between select hospitals in Baltimore County; and 2) an
exchange of certain clinical data between select hospitals in Montgomery County. 29 The default
policy in Maryland has been that patients are notified at the point of care about the existence of
CRISP and about their ability to opt out of all exchange participation. 30 Compared to DHIN,
CRISP affords patients greater opportunity to exercise their consent options. Patients can opt out
of the exchange by calling a toll-free phone number and requesting to have their information
excluded. 31 Alternatively, if they wish to participate, they can affirmatively enroll in CRISP via
phone or by completing a form available from their provider’s office. 32 Depending on the
particular anticipated use of the information, additional patient consent may be required. 33 These
permutations have not yet been fully explored, as Maryland’s electronic exchange, like many
other states’, is still evolving.
As in Indiana, state laws in Virginia and Tennessee do not require express consent from patients
to share their general clinical information electronically for treatment purposes or for other
purposes expressly permitted under law. 34 The CareSpark organization, which spans areas of
both Virginia and Tennessee, therefore has chosen an opt-out model. However, the CareSpark
Board of Directors felt strongly that community members involved in the exchange should be
well educated about the process. 35 As a result, CareSpark established an opt-out with notice
policy, meaning that no data are included in the system until the patient has received at least
minimal education about the exchange. 36 At present, this education occurs largely in provider
settings. CareSpark leaves the question of whether more strenuous consent policies should be
used to the discretion of individual provider organizations. 37 If provider organizations prefer,
they can require express consent (or denial thereof) from their patients.38
Opt-in
The legal environment, stakeholder orientation, and governance structures in some other states
have resulted in the development of consent models that allow for more patient choice.
Exchanges in Rhode Island, New York, and Massachusetts all use variations of opt-in
approaches. The Rhode Island Quality Institute (RIQI), for example, uses an opt-in with
restrictions model. To participate in the Rhode Island exchange, patients must actively enroll in
RIQI (opt in) and can then exercise one of three options for participation:
1. Allow all provider organizations involved in their care to access information;
29

Phone call with David Sharp, Director of the Maryland Center for Health Information Technology, Maryland
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30
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2. Authorize only certain provider organizations to access information; or
3. Authorize the “default” setting, which provides temporary access to information by a
licensed practitioner only in the case of an emergency or unanticipated event. 39
New York’s exchanges also have adopted opt-in models. The models vary depending on the
entity involved, and generally take one of two forms: 1) the provider obtains patient consent at
the point of care; or 2) the exchange obtains patient consent using a multi-provider consent form
that can be accessed either at the point of service or online via the entity’s website. 40
Similarly, the three pilot programs launched by the Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative
(MAeHC) operate using an opt-in model. Patient consent for participation in MAeHC is also
obtained at the point of care. 41 At a patient’s first visit to a given clinical entity, he or she is
given the option to have all clinical data from that entity included in the exchange. 42 Similar to
Rhode Island’s model, patients can identify which provider entities can and cannot contribute
their information to the exchange. 43
A final and unique model of electronic exchange is the health record bank, with which patients
create personal accounts using web-based tools such as Microsoft HealthVault, Google Health to
store their personal health information in one location. With a patient’s consent, copies of his or
her health information can then be transferred from the point of care into the health record bank
account. 44 Patients can then allow release of this information to providers and other entities of
their choosing. 45 In part because it places a high value on consumer control, the State of
Washington has recently implemented four health record bank pilot programs in communities
across the state. 46 It should be noted, however, that this is not the only exchange model
underway in Washington, and the preferences that patients express through use of this model do
not – at least at present – affect the flow of information directly among providers and other
organizations subject to HIPAA.
Type of Information Exchanged
An examination of exchange efforts across the country reveals that, while most entities start by
sharing the same types of information, the practice evolves over time as the exchange matures.
Largely due to the fact that many of these data are readily available in standard electronic
39
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formats, exchanges typically begin with laboratory data and radiology reports, and then advance
to highly codified data elements, such as hospital admissions, discharge, and transfer summaries.
We identified no examples of clinical notes exchange, and few examples of problem lists and
other categories of information for which there has been little harmonization in either
definitional or technical standards.
In sum, we have found that some exchanges are more mature in this respect than others. Since
beginning its operations in 2007, DHIN’s results delivery function automatically uploads a
patient’s laboratory data, radiology reports, and hospital admissions, discharge, and transfer data
to the DHIN system at the point of care without patient consent. 47 DHIN plans to expand this
list by adding PACS data 48 to the system in January 2011, which would allow a provider to view
a patient’s radiology images through a link in the radiology reports. 49 DHIN also expects to
include a patient’s 90-day medication history in the near future. 50 Similarly, laboratory data,
medication data, and x-rays are currently eligible for transfer into patient health record banks in
Washington. 51 Presently in test mode, Rhode Island’s RIQI does not currently exchange any
type of health information; however, RIQI has short-term plans to exchange laboratory data and
medication history, with longer-term plans to exchange radiology reports and summary discharge
reports. 52
The MAeHC and the IHIE are examples of more sophisticated HIOs, and exchange a wide array
of health information. The MAeHC gives providers access to a community repository of clinical
summaries, including data on patient problems, procedures, allergies, medications,
demographics, smoking status, diagnosis, lab results, and radiology reports. 53 Similarly, several
types of data are available for exchange in the IHIE, including labs, pathology, radiology,
emergency department reports, electrocardiogram reports, medication history, discharge
summaries, allergies / immunizations, ambulatory appointment data, claims processing, and
prescription data. 54 IHIE also offers several business models and electronic exchange services
through its system, including a clinical messaging service that delivers test results from labs to
the doctor’s office, a patient look-up service, and a quality metrics and reporting service. 55
How Information is Used
In addition to variation in the type of information exchanged, differences exist across state-level
exchanges with respect to the ways in which health information can be used. Some, such as the
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IHIE, augment their choice of consent model by limiting data exchange to particular use cases.56
In the IHIE, which uses a no consent model, a patient’s data are maintained in separate vaults, or
clinical repositories, by the generating institution until a provider triggers an allowed use. 57 At
that time, the patient’s data becomes available to the provider, but only for a limited time
window that depends on the specific use case. 58 Emergency departments, for example, have
limited access to health information data for only 24 hours. 59 DHIN, which uses an opt-out
model for its patient query function, uses a similar “break the glass” system to access
information in emergency and / or unanticipated circumstances. Emergency department
physicians in Delaware who work within the DHIN are designated as “superusers” and may
access a patient’s data at any time. Physicians and specified staff may access a patient’s record
in non-emergencies if there is no previously established clinical relationship, but must specify a
time frame and purpose (e.g., for a new patient who has made an appointment for a given day).
All such access events are subject to audit by the DHIN, both routinely and at the request of the
patient. However, this type of access is not available at all (for any type of provider) for patients
who have chosen to opt out of the query function.
Most state exchanges currently allow patient information to be used for treatment purposes
only. 60 While some indicate a preference to continue in this vein, others have plans to expand
their uses of collected health information. For example, data presently exchanged through
CareSpark is used for treatment purposes only, but the entity’s goal is to expand to public health
reporting and eventually to other research applications. 61 The type of information exchanged in
the CareSpark system is also influenced by state law. Currently, CareSpark only exchanges
general clinical information, which expressly excludes any type of information deemed sensitive
under state laws in Virginia and Tennessee. 62 However, this policy is presently under review
and could change in the future. 63
Although data exchanged in Maryland’s CRISP is primarily used for treatment purposes,
CRISP’s secondary use cases include public health reporting, research, and biosurveillance. 64
CRISP policy makers have also recognized that great potential exists for using the exchange for
early identification of communicable diseases, chronic disease management, data mining, and
identification of potential research participants. 65 CRISP leadership also recognizes, however,
that sound policy development and consumer education will be necessary to enable these
secondary uses. 66
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Granularity Options
Only one of the eight exchanges considered in this analysis, the Washington health record bank
model, allows patients to segment information in the exchange by data type. Although
Washington’s health record banks allow patients to sequester certain types of data from view, a
patient’s ability to do so depends on the type of software used to manage his / her health record
bank account. 67 The two types of software available for use in Washington’s health record
banks, currently Google Health and Microsoft HealthVault, have different capabilities. At
present, Google Health does not provide the same level of granularity as Microsoft HealthVault,
which offers patients the ability to control the type of information providers see.68
Although many state-level HIOs do not currently support segmentation of health information by
data type, a few have established consent models that allow patients to segment data either by
provider organization or by individual provider. Currently, both RIQI and Washington’s health
record banks allow segmentation by provider, meaning that a patient can select which specific
providers can view his or her health data. Maryland’s CRISP also has expressed intentions to
enable this level of consumer control once health record bank efforts gain more traction in the
state. 69 Enabling patients to provide some level of input as to who can view their health
information, under what conditions, and for what purpose, represents a tremendous opportunity
for growth among state-level exchange efforts, and one that would be strongly supported by
consumer and patient advocacy groups seeking greater engagement in their health and health
care.
How Consent Is Obtained
In each of the state models described above, the process for obtaining consent varies. In general,
consent is obtained (or not) at the provider point of care level, with educational assistance
regarding notification and consent options often facilitated by the relevant HIO. Other
approaches include active outreach on the part of the HIO, with some providing consent tools via
the web or over the phone. These approaches allow patients to complete relevant forms and
specify provider access preferences directly through the HIO. Some models rely upon a onetime event for obtaining patient consent, while others call for multiple interactions. In addition,
some HIOs apply a single form for all use cases, whereas others tailor the forms to specific uses
of data.
The DHIN and CareSpark models exemplify a provider-centric approach to educating patients
about consent options. DHIN places all responsibility for notifying patients of its opt-out
procedures on providers, offering them talking points, sample privacy language, and
confidentiality forms to assist them in their conversations with patients. 70 Similarly, in the
CareSpark model, providers are responsible for educating patients and notifying them of the
exchange policies. CareSpark has an employee who trains provider organizations on the consent
process, and also supplies providers with written educational materials that can be used during
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the notification process. 71 Most provider organizations affiliated with the CareSpark exchange
use a paper notice or consent form when they first discuss the subject with a patient. 72
Other state exchanges obtain patient consent using a combination of provider-based and other
approaches. Patients can enroll in Maryland’s CRISP via phone or through a form provided at
the point of care. 73 At present, a CRISP policy board is determining whether one consent form
should cover all (or most) use cases, or whether multiple consent forms should be used for
various secondary uses of data, including biosurveillance and public health. 74 Exchanges in New
York also have two approaches for obtaining patient consent: one that allows the provider
organization to obtain consent at the point of service, and another that allows the specific
exchange to obtain consent through a multi-provider consent form that can be accessed either at
the point of service or online via the entity’s website. 75 Finally, RIQI trains staff in participating
provider organizations to walk patients through the consent process and assist them with
completion of the enrollment and authorization forms. 76 Alternatively, patients seeking to enroll
in RIQI can do so directly through Rhode Island’s “Current Care” website, 77 though they must
also call a hotline to indicate their provider preferences.78
Durability of Consent
Many state-level HIOs have made the determination that a patient’s consent to participate in the
exchange remains in effect until expressly revoked. In others, consent is valid only for a limited
time, and depends on a set of pre-defined conditions. Exchanges that require consent for specific
use cases include the IHIE, RIQI, and CRISP. IHIE gives providers access to patient data in the
system for various lengths of time, depending on the specific use case. 79 Similarly, CRISP plans
to require additional patient consent for some use cases, but has not yet established those
parameters. 80 Furthermore, it is possible that general parameters might apply to all exchanges
operating within the CRISP HIO umbrella, but vary from one to another in terms of specifics.
Patients who select the default consent setting in RIQI, which provides temporary access to a
patient’s information only in the event of an emergency or unanticipated event, authorize access
to their data for a period of 72 hours only. 81 In other state models, such as DHIN, the New York
exchanges, and two of the consent options in RIQI, patient consent is durable until expressly
revoked. Patients enrolled in these exchanges have the ability to revoke their participation at any
time. If patients in the New York entities or RIQI revoke participation in the exchange, their
existing data remains, but will be sequestered and denoted as inaccessible unless required by law.
71
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Data Security Oversight and Accountability
To build consumer trust in electronic exchange and ensure that sensitive information is protected,
systems of electronic exchange should contain built-in security protections, and have
mechanisms of enforcement in place for when health information is misused or a security breach
occurs. Currently, some safeguards in state-level exchanges are more vigorous than others, and
states vary in the degree to which audit and enforcement penalties are built into state law.
As a baseline, all of the electronic exchanges reviewed for this project require some form of
authentication in order for providers to gain access to information via the exchange. Many have
also tried to limit vulnerability by proceeding with the exchange of data that do not qualify as
sensitive, as contemplated in federal and state law. CareSpark, for example, attempts to ensure
that sensitive information is not shared by restricting the participation of facilities that primarily
serve patients with sensitive conditions. 82 While the representatives of CareSpark with whom
we spoke acknowledge that this is a sub-optimal approach with potentially negative implications
for both patients and providers, they have settled on this approach as an interim solution.
In part to offset the fact that patients in Delaware have limited opportunity to exclude themselves
from the exchange, DHIN has put systemic protections in place to protect patient information. In
the DHIN system, providers can only access health records of their current patients, and must
“break glass” (i.e., follow a specified protocol) to obtain data on a patient they have not yet
treated. 83 In addition, providers can design system security so that only certain staff can access
data through the exchange. 84 Patients also have the right to obtain an audit report of providers
who have accessed their records. 85 DHIN routinely conducts audits to ensure compliance with
these policies, and revokes the privileges of providers who misuse the exchange. 86
Washington’s health record banks and the New York exchanges also contain audit functions,
which allow patients to find out when and by whom their records have been accessed. 87
Another security method employed by many state exchanges is the use of firewalls. The State of
Rhode Island is currently supporting the development of a technology solution that will reside
for the time being at each contributing provider site. The interface will contain a firewall, which
will require the participation status of patients to be ascertained before information is shared
outside the firewall. 88 The New York exchanges also include safeguards enabling a patient to
lock certain data behind a firewall so that it can only be seen by a designated primary care
physician. 89
Many states rely upon state law to establish enforcement and penalty mechanisms for the use
(and misuse) of health information in exchanges. The Rhode Island Health Information
Exchange Act of 2008, for example, gives patients the right to obtain reports of the health
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information that has been shared through RIQI and the identities of those who access the
information, in addition to notices of security breaches. 90 New York’s Education law makes it
professional misconduct for a physician to reveal a patient’s health information to a third party
without patient consent. 91 Finally, legislation in Delaware specifies that any misuse of DHIN
health information or data must be reported to the state Office of the Attorney General, and that
violators will be subject to prosecution and penalties under either the Delaware Criminal Code or
federal law. 92
Each of these examples speaks to the notion that there are multiple, necessary dimensions to
consumer protection, and that an entity’s determination of which consent model to use in
electronic exchange is an important – but still only one – consideration. Consent models that do
not incorporate patient preferences as an initial matter can be augmented with legal, technical,
security, and privacy policies designed to protect patient data. As discussed in depth below,
while consent plays a critical role in protecting patient privacy and autonomy, it is not the only
method by which patient interests can be protected in electronic exchange.
Examples of Exchange in Other Developed Countries (See Appendix C)
Canada
Canada is currently developing interoperable electronic exchange for its 32 million residents.
The system is being developed and funded primarily through Canada Health Infoway, a not-forprofit corporation whose members are the 14 federal, provincial, and territorial Deputy Ministers
of Health. Infoway supports HIT development by way of strategic investments in local and
regional infrastructure projects. Specific consent policies are developed primarily at the
provincial level and are largely opt-out systems with various degrees of granularity. 93 The
federal government has created a set of guidelines to promote further harmonization and
development of consent policies nationwide, the Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy and
Confidentiality Framework, 94 and is developing a nationwide system to track consent directives
through the Consent Directive Management Service. 95 Infoway plans to have fully interoperable
EHRs for its entire population by 2016. 96
The Netherlands
The Dutch National Healthcare Information Hub (LSP), currently being implemented by the
National Information and Communication Technology Institute for Healthcare (NICTIZ), is an
opt-out with exceptions system built around remote information hubs connected to a national,
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searchable database. This system, referred to as the “health care Google,” maintains patient
records at the practitioner or regional level (where regional electronic exchange already exists),
and makes them available through a searchable database accessible to eligible practitioners
throughout the country (i.e., those who meet a set of minimum security and functionality
requirements). 97 The country is currently debating whether to require all practices to connect to
the LSP. 98 While consent to share medical information is implied for treatment purposes,
patients have the option of segmenting data based on provider, care delivery setting, and data
type, and may also opt out of the exchange entirely. 99
Sweden
Sweden began trials on May 4, 2009 to implement a health information exchange starting with
the Municipality and County Council of Örebro. 100 Sweden plans to place all digitized records
on a central server, but to allow patients to authorize which physicians will be able to access their
records in the database. 101 Patients must also restrict the time period in which the provider can
continue to access their records after giving initial permission. Sweden’s system will also
restrict how much of the medical record providers can see. However, county councils and
municipalities, not patients, designate which professionals can see which parts of the record.
The system has a “break the glass” provision that allows health care professionals to access
records in an emergency, but the access will be logged and providers will have to explain why
they needed to view the information. 102
ANALYSIS OF CHOICE MODELS
Having identified the five core consent models, potential granularity options, and examples of
individual consent approaches in the U.S. and abroad, we now turn to an analysis of key factors
that likely would influence the choice of one particular consent model over another. As a
preamble, we provide an overview of the needs, concerns, and general perspectives associated
with each of the major categories of stakeholders typically involved in electronic exchange. The
analysis section itself is organized into three major parts. The first is a discussion of certain
ethical and cultural considerations relevant to the determination of which choice model to
apply. The second focuses on some of the critical logistical, technical, and process
considerations (with respect to consent) that often emerge in the course of establishing an
exchange, and the third describes the federal and state legal framework that shapes the
environments in which consent decisions are made.
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Stakeholder Perspectives
Nearly every stakeholder in health care has preferences for, and will be affected by, the consent
model approach selected to support electronic exchange. Not surprisingly, these stakeholders
differ in their emphasis on and prioritization of features associated with the various models, and
will be affected in diverse ways by the selected approach. Sometimes the impact may be
characterized as logistical in nature (e.g., the imposition of administrative burden), and other
times may present a financial strain or practice concern. Still others reflect the fears and
concerns associated with the potential for misuse of information (e.g., discrimination, social
stigmatization). All of these perspectives are valid, and must be considered in the context of the
core policy objectives and operating principles established by a given exchange. It should be
noted that the stakeholder perspectives articulated below are intended to reflect the predominant
view, and do not attempt to accommodate the natural variability and wide ranging spectrum of
individual perspectives that likely exist.
Patients / Consumers
In numerous polls and focus groups, consumers have expressed strong support for the
implementation and exchange of EHRs, believing that these technologies have the potential to
improve care coordination, reduce paperwork, and reduce the number of unnecessary and
repeated tests and procedures. 103 These same studies also reveal significant consumer concern
over who has access to their health information and how it is used. 104 In a focus group study
conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, participants voiced concern –
both spontaneously and when prompted by a moderator – that electronic health data are more
prone than paper to security breaches and misuse by entities such as employers and insurance
companies. 105 When asked about the issue of consent, a large proportion of participants believed
that their consent should be sought by a physician or staff member before their health
information could be shared electronically, and also perceived this as an opportunity to specify
who could access this data. 106
Generally, consumers want to equip their health care providers with the information necessary to
support the delivery of well-coordinated and high-quality care. Some have concerns, however,
about the potential for intrusions on their privacy and, more importantly, how their information
might be accessed and used in unanticipated and / or damaging ways. 107 Recent stories in the
news concerning improper access to medical information by unauthorized staff, data breaches,
and large-scale data losses may raise patients’ concern that the wrong people will be able to
access their health information. Consumers may be protective of their health information in part
because disclosure of such information – whether deemed sensitive or not – can cause
embarrassment and may be used as a basis for discrimination (e.g., denial of health insurance and
loans, denial / loss of a job, criminal liability). Absent the existence of an overarching set of
policies that offer protections against discrimination and other negative consequences associated
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with unwanted information exposure, it is likely that many consumers would express a
preference for systems that afford them a high level of control.
In focus group settings, consumers have indicated that controlling access to specific health data
or categories of data would increase their trust and willingness to participate in electronic
exchange. 108 For some, this goal might be accomplished through granularity of choice by
provider, time stamp, or data use. For others, however, opt-in models with full granularity (e.g.,
a health record bank model) might be the only consent option that sufficiently meets their
concerns. In this scenario, consumers might also prefer to have choice beyond the categories
established for what has been deemed sensitive information, and might desire the ability to
define and then restrict specific information from electronic exchange.
While blanket opt-in and opt-out models allow patients to choose whether or not their
information can be shared, these models force an all or nothing decision. Given this level of
choice, patients with specific privacy concerns would likely opt out (or refuse to opt in) in order
to prevent information that they consider to be too private to share from being disclosed via the
exchange. This action could not only reduce the patient’s access to high-quality / wellcoordinated care, but might also, as described below, have negative consequences for other
stakeholders as well.
Providers
Individual health care providers participating in electronic exchange want at least the following
three basic elements from the experience: 1) consistent and comprehensive access to information
that will improve their capacity to deliver high-quality, well-coordinated care; 2) assurance that
their reliance on electronic exchange as an important information source will not increase their
exposure to liability; and 3) minimization of technical, financial, and administrative burden
associated with participation, including workflow modifications required for obtaining and
managing consent). 109
Given their preference for more rather than less patient information, many providers do not
support consent models that potentially limit either the number of patients participating in
electronic exchange, or the amount / types of information available for a specific patient.
Generally speaking, providers worry that any treatment decision made without access to relevant
information might impact negatively their ability to provide quality care, and could expose them
to medical liability. 110 This concern is essentially a critical mass issue, which is to say that
providers will only participate in electronic exchange to the extent that they perceive value in
doing so. This issue is evident in other HIT-related areas as well. For example, a recent AHRQ108
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supported survey of 228 outpatient primary care providers found that non-use among previous
users of e-prescribing systems was associated with perceptions of poor usability and lack of
complete information available through the system. 111
Providers also have expressed concern about the increased financial and administrative burden
associated with initiating and maintaining a consent management process. 112 In an environment
where many providers already face challenges in adopting and using and, eventually,
demonstrating “meaningful use” 113 of HIT systems, the need to educate patients about their
consent options, integrate information regarding the administration of consent into their practice
workflow, and adhere to that directive is perceived as being overly onerous.
Finally, timeliness of access to information via electronic exchange may be impacted by the
choice of consent model, and certainly has implications for the provider community. For
example, a consent model with protocols to restrict information access based on a specific set of
use cases, and / or that requires express patient consent to access sensitive information, might be
perceived as creating undue bureaucratic barriers to obtaining important clinical information.
Many entities address this issue by instituting a “break the glass” provision, which typically
allows providers to access any available medical information in unexpected and / or an
emergency situation. However, these provisions do not guarantee rapid access, as some
exchanges require special codes or processes to gain access to the information.
Provider Organizations
Like individual clinicians, provider organizations want to minimize the administrative, financial
and technical burdens imposed by consent requirements and generally share the concerns
outlined above. Their workflow concerns, however, are compounded, as any consent
requirement would need to be applied consistently across the entire organization, not just by
discrete providers or business units, and account for a larger patient population. Experience from
HIPAA implementation shows that upfront capital costs for training staff, implementing new
patient consent procedures, and changing workflow processes to ensure compliance can increase
along with the size of the provider organization. 114 Likewise, estimates of the cost of
implementing a national health information exchange are highest among the largest provider
organizations. 115 Large provider organizations therefore hold a key position in both developing
and implementing interoperable health information exchange.
Professional organizations such as the American Medical Association and the American College
of Physicians generally have supported the adoption of HIT with strong privacy protections, and
wish to see systems developed in such a way that preserves patient choice by encouraging active
111
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communication between providers and their patients. These groups also have expressed a
preference for unencumbered physician access to all available patient medical data, with the
noted exception of certain categories of sensitive data, such as psychiatric notes. 116 Because
large provider organizations are often highly visible in the community and typically provide care
to medically and culturally diverse populations, having access to accurate records and building
patient confidence in the health care system are viewed as important goals, particularly given the
high costs associated with implementation. Further, to the extent that electronic exchange itself
might represent a revenue enhancement opportunity for a provider organization, bolster its
reputation within the community, and / or help facilitate research or other partnerships, volume
and completeness of data likely would be important elements. For these reasons, provider
organizations might have an additional interest in implementing low-resistance consent models
(e.g., opt-out) to ensure the adequacy of the data for those purposes.
Payer Organizations
Payer organizations, as well as the employers that constitute their client base, are increasingly
engaging in health care quality improvement efforts, and are appealing directly to members to
use tools (e.g., personal health records (PHRs)) and participate in disease management initiatives
to support their overall health. In this context, it seems reasonable that payers generally want
access to clinical and other information that could be of use in these efforts, and therefore would
want to ensure maximum participation in and sharing of data. Ultimately, payers hope to realize
the benefits of electronic exchange through reductions in their own expenditures. For these
reasons, as discussed in the section on provider interests above, payers generally would prefer
low-resistance consent models that yield high participation and data volume. 117
A final consideration is that many payers are investing significantly in the development of
electronic exchange, and often make claims data available to organizational participants. 118 It is
therefore understandable that they would not want consent restrictions to prevent them from
realizing any anticipated benefits of these ventures.
HIOs
Electronic exchange organization leaders want to ensure that any consent policies and procedures
adopted permit the entities to provide valuable services, fulfill their mission to the community of
participants, evolve over time, and remain financially viable. As such, HIOs share many of the
same concerns as their provider participants regarding administrative burden, particularly to the
extent that it could limit the use and utility of the enterprise as a whole.
An additional layer of complexity is that much of the infrastructure supporting the consent
process is oftentimes the responsibility of the exchange entity itself. For example, most state-led
exchanges rely on the HIO to build and maintain the intelligence infrastructure that manages and
monitors consent, including data capture, the application of decision rules for appropriate access,
116
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the authentication of eligible providers to the system, etc. For this reason, less complicated
consent policies and procedures are generally preferred. And, to the extent that an HIO may
need to coordinate policies with others or comply with those of other organizations, there is also
concern that they will be unable to accommodate downstream operations.
HIOs also may want to allow for flexibility, as they may need to accommodate a range of
consent preferences as dictated by their participating provider organizations. Such flexibility is
evidenced in many existing exchanges (e.g., CareSpark and NY entities), in that participating
provider organizations have the latitude to engage in consent procedures that exceed the baseline
requirements of the HIO (e.g., they can obtain express patient consent if that is preferred). 119
Policy Makers
Finally, policy makers at all levels who are tasked with supporting the development of electronic
exchange face the key challenge of making decisions despite the fact that they will not be able to
address simultaneously the needs and concerns of all of the multiple and diverse stakeholders.
Policy makers must envision the end goals of electronic exchange (e.g., better health and health
care quality, improved public health reporting, more engaged patients) and develop consent and
other policy guidelines that are most likely to yield the desired results without compromising
privacy or alienating key partners. In this respect, there is possibly no single consent model that
is more likely to appeal to policy makers—all of the models require tradeoffs and depend on the
particular interests and needs of the affected stakeholders.
Ethical and Cultural Considerations
Individual Choice and Public Good
Policy decisions regarding how and to what extent patients exercise control over the electronic
exchange of their health information have been discussed at times as representing the degree to
which patient privacy and autonomy are preserved in a networked health environment.
Autonomy is the ethical principle underlying an individual’s right to make and carry out
informed decisions that arise from unbiased and thoughtful deliberation. Self-determination is
the derivative of autonomy most commonly associated with informed consent and health care,
pursuant to which an autonomous agent who understands the relevant facts and can engage in
practical reasoning freely makes decisions. 120 As both clinical and research medicine
traditionally have relied upon informed consent to further these ethical principles in practice, the
proper role of informed consent in electronic information sharing has been widely discussed in
recent years.
It has been suggested that an individual’s participation in electronic exchange should be thought
of as a type of medical intervention in which “one needs to balance the benefits of using the
systems with the potential risks to the patient.” 121 While a consent model that allows for greater
patient control over his or her medical records (such as an opt-in with restrictions model) may
119
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provide more choice to the individual patient, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether
access to a range of choices ultimately satisfies the health interests of the individual patient and,
more broadly, undermines the utility of the exchange for both the patient and society. In
addition, it has been argued that over-reliance on consent could lead to “consent fatigue,” where
patients presented with too many complex consent forms unknowingly agree to uses and
disclosures of their health information. 122 The concern is that a system that relies on consent
alone to maintain patient choice and privacy paradoxically may subvert these goals by shifting
the focus away from true autonomous choice and toward a legally binding, but ethically
questionable, process that consists primarily of the mere signing of forms.
Many groups, including the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) and the Markle
Foundation, instead have recommended integrating individual control and consent into a robust
framework of legal, technical, and policy rules organized to protect the privacy and security of
data within an electronic exchange. 123 Within this paradigm, they suggest that individuals
should be informed about and agree with how their health information is being collected and
used, but not rely on consent alone to bear the full weight of privacy protection. 124 Many of the
HIOs reviewed in this paper, including DHIN, the New York exchanges, and RIQI, have built
such frameworks into their exchange policies; relevant state laws that support such infrastructure
have been developed as well. In the absence of well-defined infrastructure, however, an entity’s
choice of consent model may take on more importance for the individual as providing the sole or
one of a few vehicles for ensuring adequate data controls and protections.
One important but confounding challenge in discussing consent’s role in electronic exchange is
taking into account the benefits that it promises on a societal scale. Encouraging individuals to
seek care in the first instance by promising confidentiality helps fulfill the societal goal of having
a healthy population. While electronic exchange has the potential to advance such societal goods
as population health and clinical research, this effect diminishes as fewer patients participate and
less data are available. These uses of health data promise benefits for both the individual and
society, but their potential ultimately depends on the extent to which such data are made
available for these purposes. Eike-Henner Kluge notes that, from an ethical perspective, those
who wish to benefit from HIT (including any quality improvement within the health care system
as a whole) but do not participate in the system constitute “free riders.” 125 While it does not
necessarily follow that participation in electronic exchange should be mandatory, the overall
costs and benefits to all participants must be considered in deciding consent’s proper role in
electronic exchange. It has been noted that, at least in our current health care system, the
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individual, as opposed to society as a whole, bears the primary risks associated with the improper
use and disclosure of information, such as losing employment or insurance. 126
Ultimately, striking a balance between enabling autonomy and patient choice and achieving
socially fair and legally valid standards for medical data use and electronic exchange recalls the
foundations of the doctrine of informed consent itself—meeting legal and professional standards
of informed consent does not always fulfill the ethical obligation of maintaining patient
autonomy. As health information becomes more complex and widely available, our societal
challenge is to develop consent rules and procedures within HIT that honor the goal of
autonomous choice while simultaneously acknowledging considerations of clinical efficacy,
resource restrictions, and the greater social good. 127
Consent in the Privacy Context
Many of the concerns surrounding patient choice and privacy in the HIT context are, in a sense,
extensions of reservations patients currently have regarding their medical records. It is estimated
that one in six Americans engage in “privacy-protective behavior” due to concerns over
unwanted disclosures of their medical data, with higher rates among those who are in poor health
and ethnic and racial minorities. 128 Surveys have also shown that the majority of Americans are
“very concerned” about identity theft or fraud (80 percent), the use of their medical information
for marketing purposes (77 percent), and that their data might become available to employers or
insurance companies (56 and 55 percent, respectively). 129 At the same time, 89 percent of
respondents say that they want their physicians to be able to communicate with one another,130
while the majority support the development of HIT as a whole and believe that it will improve
care and reduce costs. 131 Furthermore, while consumer opinion regarding unrestricted access to
even de-identified health data for research purposes is not positive, the vast majority of
respondents are supportive of such research provided that consent is sought beforehand. 132
While there seems to be general agreement among the experts we interviewed that patients
should have some control over their electronic data and its uses, the ideal reach of that control is
less clear. Opt-in or opt-out consent frameworks could meet these goals, but within those broad
areas, policy makers and system developers must design specific sets of choice options. A
model that allows for individual control over each data element might compromise clinical
efficiency. Many proposed and existing electronic exchange systems therefore choose
granularity options based upon different parameters, such as provider type or time-stamp, or
eliminate granularity altogether. Even the most ardent supporters of consent acknowledge that
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policy makers legitimately may take account of what is fair and reasonable to require of health
care professionals in protecting autonomy. 133
Successful electronic exchange systems engage consumers, physicians and other stakeholders at
an early stage to ensure that choice is integrated into the architecture of the systems. The
MAeHC illustrates this approach. Using an opt-in system without granularity, MAeHC achieved
an average of 90 percent participation in its three pilot communities (granularity was not an
option, in part because only a limited set of data was included in the exchange). This high level
of participation was attributed to several factors, including early and ongoing community
participation in the formation of the Collaborative, the use of marketing materials that
underscored the benefits of the exchange to both patients and providers, and a high level of
support among physicians, which in turn fostered greater patient trust. 134 Conversely, as
discussed in greater detail in Appendix C, the nationwide Dutch EHR system encountered
significant difficulty in achieving wide participation despite the high level of choice allowed by
the system, which was attributed to a lack of consumer understanding of both their privacy
options and the quality improvement goals of the system as a whole. 135 Many privacy advocates
point to these experiences to support their arguments that individual patient participation and
control are key enablers for successful electronic exchange. 136
Electronic exchange systems that utilize opt-in or opt-out choice models that allow for some
level of granularity generally are considered more protective of patient choice and privacy than
those that do not provide granularity of choice. What health information is included, how and to
what degree patients can choose who sees their data, and how these standards are upheld in law
are critical questions to be addressed by any entity in advance of engaging in electronic
exchange. Early involvement of consumers in the planning of these systems will help to build
trust as well as ensure that patients have a degree of choice that encourages participation and
upholds privacy standards while meeting the clinical goals of improved quality and efficiency.
Human Factors
Particularly in the U.S., where individual freedom and choice are highly valued, a common
perception is that more choice is always better than less. Studies have shown, however, that
while people may prefer to choose from as many alternatives as possible, decision-making ability
is compromised when too many choices are offered. 137 One prominent study that documented
this effect involved an offer of free jam samples at a supermarket in California.138 Researchers
alternated between showing two different sample displays in the same store—one that included
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six samples of jam and another that included 24 samples of jam. Although a larger percentage of
people walking past the display stopped when it contained 24 samples, only three percent of
these people eventually purchased one of the jams. Conversely, 30 percent of people who
sampled from the display with six choices eventually bought jam. The researchers hypothesized
that when people are faced with “too much choice,” they feel burdened by the responsibility of
choosing between good and bad decisions and are less able psychologically to distinguish
between the choices. 139 They also concluded that the “too much choice” effect would be more
pronounced in choices such as medical treatment decisions, since these decisions involve greater
costs associated with making a “wrong” choice and take substantial time and effort to make an
informed comparison. People are more likely to avoid this perceived time and effort barrier in
favor of entrusting the choice to someone else, choosing randomly, or avoiding the choice
altogether. 140
This body of evidence should be taken into account when considering the array of policy
approaches that could be established to manage consent in an electronic exchange, particularly
those involving greater granularity. Surveys have indicated that the public wants a wide range of
choices with respect to how their information is shared, with whom, and for what purposes. 141 In
a “perfect” choice environment, patients would have the time, interest, and incentives to learn
about and consider a variety of factors for each opt-in and opt-out choice placed on their “menu”
of options. As discussed above, it is important for patients to understand the full context of their
decisions, including the benefits of having their information in the electronic exchange as well as
any associated risk to their privacy. 142
The method used to obtain consent can also affect human decision making. If consent is
obtained at a medical institution, for example, patients may limit their deliberations based on
how much time they think they have before an appointment or how much time they think they
will have with their physicians. This could result in a quick “checking of the boxes,” or a
complete opt in or opt out rather than the exercise of true choice. 143 Further, both the complexity
of the information shared and the way in which a choice is framed may affect a patient’s ability
to make a decision. 144 Each factor increases the magnitude of the “too much choice” effect and
has its own impact on the decision. People sometimes have trouble comprehending information
regarding unfamiliar subjects. 145 Moreover, a choice can seem complicated for a number of
reasons, including hard-to-follow explanations and elaborate presentations. As a result of the
perceived complexity of decisions in the health care context, patients may become more inclined
to trust their providers’ judgments. 146 In the electronic exchange context in particular, patients
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presented with several information sharing options might feel pressure to defer to their
providers’ suggestions rather than completely evaluate the privacy and confidentiality risks of
information exposure. If being given more choice adds to complexity, patients might also
understand less about their options.
The provision of opt-out notices in the retail banking industry presents a good case study for
examining the challenges associated with the presentation of complex choice information to
consumers. In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leech-Bliley Act, which mandated that
financial institutions give consumers an opportunity to opt out of having their information
disclosed to nonaffiliated third parties. 147 According to the statute, a financial institution must
“clearly and conspicuously” explain its policies regarding disclosure to third parties, and inform
consumers of the opportunity to opt out. 148 When the first notices were sent, however, consumer
groups complained that they were hard to understand and sometimes misleading. 149 The
American Bankers Association estimated that only five percent of consumers exercised their optout option in the years immediately following implementation of the Act. 150 This low
participation could partially be explained by a tendency to throw out mail but, according to a
telephone survey, two-thirds of consumers claimed to have read the disclosure notices. 151
In response to consumer pressure, Congress modified the Gramm-Leech-Bliley Act in 2006 to
mandate that the FTC create a model form for banks to use that would be “comprehensible to
consumers, with a clear format and design.” 152 The FTC has conducted several studies to
determine the best way to disclose information practices and explain the opportunity to opt out.
One of the problems these studies tackled was the reading level of the notices in response to
analyses by privacy rights groups that estimated that the average notice was written at the level
of a college junior or senior. 153 In response to this and other criticisms, the FTC developed a
model notice that is only two to three pages in length and presents key information in a table
format. 154 A study that compared the table format to the notice previously used found that
people reading the table notice were more likely to identify correctly which banks share more
information than others as well as both the substance and quality of their opt-out provisions. 155
The FTC, in conjunction with several other agencies, promulgated a final rule in November 2009
with model notice guidelines and a “safe harbor” provision for all financial institutions who
decide to switch to the table format. 156
This case study demonstrates some of the challenges (e.g., clear and audience-appropriate
presentation of information) associated with enabling consent. In the electronic exchange
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context, a consent process that fails to convey benefits and risks as well as the terms and
conditions of participation could have serious and / or undesirable consequences. Ideally, a
consent process for electronic exchange would invite participants to make an informed decision
by avoiding unnecessary complexity, clearly and concisely explaining the utility of the exchange,
and making transparent the terms and conditions for participation.
Process, Logistical and Technical Considerations in Obtaining and Managing Consent
Any electronic exchange – regardless of scale or approach – needs to determine how and by what
means it intends to execute its selected consent model. This plan involves consideration of
numerous process, logistical and technical issues that affect, often differentially, the various
stakeholders participating in the exchange. Approaches that are preferred by one group may
impose additional process or workflow requirements on another (or have more significant
financial implications) and there are some approaches that may seem reasonable from a policy
perspective but are not always technically feasible. The following discussion highlights some of
these challenges and tradeoffs by examining the process, logistical, and technical implications of
the various choice models with respect to who participates in the consent discussion and how
consent is obtained and managed.
Who Obtains and Manages Consent
Electronic exchanges vary greatly with respect to the actors they designate to assume the role of
obtaining and managing patient consent. In general, consent can be obtained and managed by
the individual practitioner or provider organization, or by the coordinating HIO or by all of the
above. Most entities have distributed responsibility for obtaining and managing consent between
these two groups. The entity coordinating exchange efforts in the State of New York, for
example, allows for consent to be obtained either directly through the exchange entity, or by a
health care provider at the point of care. The MAeHC in Massachusetts distributes
responsibilities in a different fashion, making the provider responsible for informing the patient
of the exchange and for obtaining express consent, but assigning responsibility for storage,
management, and maintenance with the governance entity. 157
It is also possible to place responsibility for both obtaining and managing consent on the HIO
itself. One advantage of this approach is that it has the potential to ensure greater uniformity of
implementation across participating providers in a more efficient manner. This approach has
been implemented by the DHIN in Delaware, which, as a default, automatically includes all
patients in the state as participants.
Regardless of how these roles are divided, models that require express patient consent for
participation in electronic exchange tend to impose greater workflow burdens on whatever entity
is designated as having either full or joint responsibility for obtaining and managing consent.
Any model that provides a level of patient choice – either to opt in or out – requires planning and
execution regarding some basic functions. In obtaining consent, these typically include tasks
associated with:
1. Establishing policies and procedures to guide the consent process;
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2. Educating both patients (about the exchange) and providers (about their responsibilities
with respect to consent management);
3. Developing methods and materials to support the education process; and
4. Developing methods and materials to obtain actual consent.
An example on the less prescriptive end of the spectrum regarding these requirements is DHIN,
which requires providers to make available (but not systematically present to patients) some
level of education about both the exchange and the opt-out procedure. DHIN offers providers
talking points, sample privacy language, and confidentiality forms to help them educate patients,
but does not require the exercise as a condition of participation. Furthermore, the management
infrastructure function is performed by DHIN directly, so the level of effort expended by
providers on the consent process is minimal. Conversely, Rhode Island has engaged RIQI to
train staff in participating provider and other organizations (including ambulatory and inpatient
care settings, employers, community-based organizations, and long-term care facilities) on how
to help patients through the consent process. This process involves helping patients to complete
an enrollment and consent form and, if the patients wish to restrict access to only certain
provider organizations, making available a telephone hotline through which patients can indicate
their provider preferences.
If the responsibility of performing these tasks falls on individual providers or provider
organizations, workflow and resource issues likely will emerge. Research has shown that, when
providers are tasked with additional responsibilities absent training, incentives, and / or adequate
time to adapt or modify their work processes, they either “work around” such impositions or
quit. 158 Likewise, asking busy providers to devote additional time to the collection and / or
tracking of myriad consent directives may call for resources that are not available, which could
lead to complete noncompliance, or a failure to uphold consent policies and procedures
adequately. Past experience with HIPAA implementation has shown that training providers and
educating patients on new privacy policies can be costly and time-consuming. 159 This issue is
more pronounced in opt-in or other “high touch” consent models, as the sheer volume of work
required is greater. For this reason, the Department of Health and Human Services in Rhode
Island has agreed to pay a one-time, three-dollar authentication 160 fee for every participant
enrolled in that state’s exchange.
If these tasks are largely delegated to HIOs, additional challenges emerge. Specifically, HIOs
tasked with obtaining consent in an opt-in model, for example, likely would require significant
resources (human and otherwise) to reach out to and secure participation of patients in their
community. Given that these entities do not have an existing relationship or the opportunity to
interface directly with patients, they would have to expend considerable time and effort to
generate the level of patient participation necessary to make the exchange valuable to providers
and other participating organizations. It is likely for this reason that every exchange evaluated as
part of this review relies on the provider community to assume some role in the consent process.
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An entirely distinct and often even more complicated and resource-intensive component of
consent management is the “back end” work, which involves maintaining and enforcing the
consent directives already obtained and applied. This process is rarely the responsibility of
individual providers or even provider organizations unless they serve as coordinating entities for
the exchange. Most often, an HIO develops functionality that enables it to:
1. Authenticate the identities of patients in the exchange;
2. Apply the consent directive appropriately to the identified patients;
3. Monitor / audit access to records via the exchange in order to validate appropriate
management; and
4. Facilitate provider access (consistent with consent preferences) to information available
through the exchange.
The technical complexity and resource implications of these tasks can vary substantially
depending on the type of consent model in place. Again, those allowing for more patient choice
are perceived as being more challenging to implement.
A complicating factor in this arena is that many of the HIT systems already in place or in the
process of being adopted lack the technical capacity to support many of the consent model
approaches fully—specifically those involving granularity of choice by data type or source. This
fact reinforces the notion that provider organizations are not well positioned to serve as the
managers of consent. The HIT systems used by most providers have been designed to organize
information for care delivery and administrative functions. These systems typically do not offer
users, for example, the option of organizing the information in the record by source (e.g., mental
health provider or obstetrician) or of easily sequestering information that is deemed by an
individual patient to be inappropriate for sharing (particularly if it is acceptable to the patient to
share the information with some participants, but not others). As such, providers likely would
have to develop or alter existing (though not standardized or harmonized) systems of decision
rules for identifying and segmenting information on multiple patients, and then manage that
information accordingly. Individual providers might well perceive this process as complicated
and a serious interference with practice workflow. Implementation across multiple parties
involved in an exchange would present the additional challenge of requiring every participating
organization first to use products that allow for the extraction of structured data, and then to
apply a similar set of standards and definitions. However, as long as EHR data from different
providers is structured, even if structured differently, the use of common terminology within the
HIO could make sharing among different systems feasible. In this case, participating
organizations would need to work collectively to map their systems’ terminology to that of the
HIO, which would require a fair amount of time and effort on the part of the organizations. 161
Despite these workflow and resource issues identified with opt-in consent models, there remain
some distinct advantages that may render such tasks worth the effort, at least at the front end of
obtaining consent. The MAeHC noted in a review, for example, that their opt-in implementation
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strategy, which involved explicit communication between patients and providers, contributed
significantly to the high level of participation and community trust. 162
A potential alternative to either provider-based or exchange-based consent directives is the use of
a third party as a type of “consent broker.” This option is discussed in more depth below.
How Consent is Obtained and Managed
In addition to deciding who in the health care system should assume primary responsibility for
the consent management process, electronic exchanges also need to address the issue of how, or
by what means, consent will be obtained. At present, paper is the most common medium for
recording consent preferences, but the process is usually precipitated by an in-person
consultation or telephone interaction. This simple method of obtaining consent for exchange has
several advantages. It is inexpensive in the short term and can also serve as physical evidence.
As noted in Appendix A, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia and Tennessee all currently offer
patients the option of opting out of the state’s electronic exchange by submitting a paper form. 163
Though not yet operational, CRISP in the State of Maryland includes all patients in the exchange
as a default, but intends to allow them to opt out by calling a toll-free phone number. As
Maryland requires a second level of consent to enable information to be accessed via the
exchange, CRISP has determined that patients also will be able to enroll at this level either via
phone or direct contact with a provider at the point of care.
If an HIO applies a choice model that requires obtaining consent for electronic exchange, it will
also need to record patient consent preferences to ensure that it continues to adhere to the
patient’s wishes. In order for the directive to be searchable and actionable for other parties,
however, the information captured needs to be made available through a shared utility designed
to support the needs and responsibilities of participating organizations. If a patient decides to opt
out of an exchange, for example, and there is no electronic record of that preference, then other
participating providers would not be able to act accordingly. In addition, paper forms can be lost
easily and are more cumbersome to share. Although a paper form may be an appropriate method
of obtaining consent when one provider wishes to transfer electronic information directly to
another, or for a patient to use in opting out of an exchange system completely, it is less so when
serving as a directive to all participants within an electronic exchange or beyond.
In response to concerns associated with maintaining patient consent preferences in paper form,
technology companies and policy makers are beginning to support electronic methods of
obtaining consent. This approach is already being applied by numerous providers when seeking
informed consent for medical procedures. For example, providers at VA centers in Atlanta and
Los Angeles have used computer software that helps to explain the risks and benefits of a
particular procedure and captures the patient’s consent within the system. 164 When accompanied
by clear communication with the provider, the process could both facilitate patient understanding
of the procedure and make it easier for the provider to keep track of the consent. 165
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Similar technology has been proposed to allow patients to create an electronic file expressing
their preferences concerning electronic exchange. Patients could create the file by using
software that guides them through a series of consent preferences in fixed categories. The
software could be associated either with the patient’s EHR (for individual providers or a specific
exchange entity) or the patient’s PHR. Once recorded, the data could be used in at least three
different ways: 1) the responsibility could be placed on the health care provider to adhere to the
patient’s consent preferences when using and sharing information; 2) the system could actively
require health care providers to signify that they understood a patient’s preferences prior to
accessing the information, and / or 3) the system could act as a gatekeeper and permit only
certain individuals to access information. 166 The first of these alternatives might not be suitable
for electronic exchanges that apply a granular consent model because of the variety of
transactions such an entity might need to undertake to comply with patient preferences.
However, it could be more suitable to systems that call for simple electronic exchange between
providers, as electronic consent records could guide the provider in deciding what information to
share. E-consent systems that require provider certifications of understanding and that act as
gatekeepers might be suitable for an electronic exchange employing granular consent, but likely
would require the use of software to keep track of and enforce a patient’s consent preferences.
E-consent systems might also employ the use of “consent directives,” which are records “of a
health care consumer’s privacy policy, which is in accordance with governing jurisdictional and
organization privacy policies that grant or withhold consent [to one or more defined entities
based on consumer preferences].” 167 The Healthcare Information Technology Standards Panel
(HITSP), for example, has created standards for a “manage consent directives transaction
package” for HIT developers to follow in creating individual software applications. In order to
meet the HITSP standards, the consent directive package may allow users to create, store,
amend, and replace a consumer preference; transmit the preference electronically; allow for
individual providers and other exchange participants to view the preference; apply the preference
to an individual health record; transmit an update of the preference; reconcile conflicting
preferences; maintain an audit log of the preference; and classify data. 168
HITSP has also described the components necessary to create such a system and how they would
interact. First, a “content creator” would allow the patient or the designated entity to input the
consent directive electronically. The patient could provide his / her directive in paper form, as
long as designated staff could then input the form into a “content creator”—a user-friendly
computer program designed to ask for and accept data. Alternatively, the patient could be
instructed to use the “content creator” form as a form of e-consent. 169 A “consent directive
management system” would then acknowledge the creation of a directive and forward the
directive to a “consent repository,” which would check for inconsistencies with existing consent
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directives from the patient. A “consent registry,” after confirming the security of the message,
would update the directive. 170
Currently, the HITSP protocol is not widely implemented and it is unclear how the guidelines for
electronic consent directives would affect provider and other exchange entity workflow.
Systems that have already obtained some form of consent from patients might need to obtain
new consent or input the preferences obtained from all of their patients into the new system. 171
Another concern is the issue of whether a consent directive system could be developed to
recognize and enforce state and federal laws and regulations pertaining to medical record access.
Since privacy rules, such as those promulgated pursuant to HIPAA, are designed to govern
people as opposed to information systems, it might be difficult for companies to develop a
system that adheres to the nuances of these laws and regulations. 172 However, the idea of using
a “consent directive” is attractive because it promotes interoperability by creating a mechanism
by which directives can be maintained to avoid potential scenarios of conflicting patient
preferences.
An electronic exchange could also rely on a patient’s PHR to act as an e-consent directive for the
exchange in at least three different ways. 173 First, a provider or other designated entity could
view a PHR directly based on the preferences expressed by the patient. This method would be
most analogous to the way the social media interface, Facebook, works, as entities could only
view all or parts of the PHR according to the patient’s expressed privacy choices. In the second
method, a PHR could be connected directly or “tethered” to an EHR maintained by a provider or
other entity. The patient’s PHR consent preferences would be exchanged directly with the EHR
and would apply to both the information offered by the patient and the information stored in the
EHR. Finally, patient preferences expressed in a PHR could be connected to an exchange
system and shared with multiple providers. Some enthusiasm exists for the PHR system of econsent because of the relative success of “” in offering specific, granular privacy options, and
the desire of patients to have direct control of their personal health information. Microsoft
HealthVault, a PHR system, offers similar granular permission options to patients in some
circumstances. Generally, patients have such options when sharing data with other users of
HealthVault, but not when sharing through third-party applications. In the latter case, users of
the system are notified in advance exactly which data elements will be shared with the thirdparty system. 174 This policy responds to the reluctance of some providers to support PHRs and
patient control of data because they worry that patient interaction with health records could lead
to the introduction of inaccurate data or the withholding of important information for treatment
purposes. However, if a PHR acts simply as a pathway for patients to view health information in
provider EHRs and a method for patients to input exchange preferences, providers’ concerns
tend to be mitigated.
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There are additional drawbacks to using a PHR system to obtain consent. For example, such
systems place much of the onus for information management directly on the patient—potentially
without necessary support. Patients have to access the internet and take the time to record and
update their consent preferences, likely requiring some level of training. One criticism of the “”
system is that its default privacy settings allow extensive sharing of a person’s profile
information without providing consumers adequate instruction concerning those settings. 175 To
prevent a PHR system from facing similar criticism, patients would need clear instruction
regarding their available privacy settings and the consequences of failing to opt out, if that choice
is available. Alternatively, a default setting that requires patients to opt in if they want to share
their information would provide a conservative option for ensuring that their preferences are
followed. Another concern in the PHR context is user authentication, as some systems allow
patients to grant various levels of access or custodial rights to anyone they choose. Critics are
concerned that a PHR system without stringent authentication requirements could be
compromised by both malicious users and unintended errors by those granted access.
One final and related issue is the durability of consent—that is, the period of time a consent
directive applies before it requires updating or re-confirmation by the patient. Requiring patients
to give consent multiple times can be both beneficial and detrimental to electronic exchange.
Despite education efforts, when a patient grants consent, he or she may not comprehend every
situation to which it will apply. In addition, as a patient’s medical status changes, he or she
might wish to amend consent preferences, but not think to do so unless prompted. For this
reason, some electronic exchanges require patients to renew their consent or specify how long it
should last. 176 However, if a patient has already expressed his or her generalized preferences,
requiring repeated consent discussions at each new provider visit might be considered
unnecessary, and could increase the likelihood of conflicting directives.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Federal Law
HIPAA
A. Elements of the Privacy Rule
One of the central pieces of federal law that protects health information privacy is the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which provides for the
promulgation of privacy regulations (the HIPAA Privacy Rule). The HIPAA Privacy Rule sets
forth rules governing the use and disclosure of protected health information (PHI) by “covered
entities,” defined as health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who
transmit health information in electronic form in connection with a covered transaction, such as
submitting a health care claim to a health plan. 177 PHI is defined as “individually identifiable
health information” that is held or transmitted by a covered entity in any form, including

175

Conn, J. “Patient consent and ‘granular’ privacy control,” ModernHealthCare, December 14, 2009. Available at:
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20091214/REG/312149987.
176
For examples of this process, see description of Sweden model in Appendix C ; and discussion of Rhode Island
model in “Durability of Consent” under “State-Led Examples of Exchange in the U.S.”
177
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009).
GW SPHHS
Department of Health Policy

40

electronic, paper, and oral media, subject to certain limited exceptions (such as the exclusion of
employment records). 178
Pursuant to the Privacy Rule, covered entities may not use or disclose PHI except as permitted or
required. 179 Covered entities are required to provide a patient’s own PHI to the patient or to the
patient’s representative, and must disclose PHI as requested by the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for audit or other enforcement purposes.180
All other disclosures pursuant to the law, including those that may be required by other federal or
state laws, are considered “permitted,” that is, allowed under the Privacy Rule.” 181 In addition,
covered entities are required by HIPAA to develop public privacy policies stating when and
under what circumstances they disclose PHI. 182
The Privacy Rule requires an “authorization” for uses and disclosures of PHI not otherwise
permitted or required. 183 An “authorization” is a detailed document defined by the Rule that
gives covered entities permission to use PHI for specified purposes. The requirements of a valid
authorization are stringent. For example, a valid authorization must specify certain details (e.g.,
a description of the PHI to be used and disclosed, the person authorized to make the use or
disclosure, the person to whom the covered entity may make the disclosure, an expiration date,
and, in some cases, the purpose for which the information may be used or disclosed).184 In
addition, a valid authorization must contain an expiration date or specify an expiration event that
relates to the individual or the purpose of the use or disclosure, 185 and must be written in “plain
language.” 186
The Privacy Rule permits covered entities to use and disclose PHI without written patient
authorization for purposes related to treatment, payment, and health care operations. 187 On the
other hand, HIPAA permits, but does not require, a covered entity to seek patient consent for
uses and disclosures of PHI for those purposes, but does not explicitly define consent or specify
the necessary content of a consent form or the process by which an entity should obtain consent.
HHS guidance, however, defines the term as written permission from individuals to use and
disclose their PHI for treatment, payment, and health care operations. 188
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When the Privacy Rule requires an authorization, voluntary consent is not sufficient to permit a
use or disclosure of PHI. 189 In most cases, a covered entity may not withhold treatment or
payment if a patient declines to authorize the particular use or disclosure. 190 Other disclosures
permitted without patient authorization include, for example, disclosures for certain public health
and research activities, 191 and for quality reporting purposes with respect to FDA-regulated
products. 192
In analyzing individual choice models in electronic exchange, it is therefore important to
consider the purpose of the exchange of information. Because of the exceptions in the Privacy
Rule, a HIPAA covered entity that exchanges PHI through an exchange entity for the purposes of
treatment, payment, health care operations, or public health activities, for example, would not be
required to obtain patient authorization pursuant to the law. However, if an entity exchanges
PHI for a purpose that would require patient authorization under the Privacy Rule, such as
disclosures for marketing purposes, 193 it may need to design its practices to allow for methods of
transmitting such authorizations through the exchange (e.g., so that a covered entity that receives
a request through the exchange for the purpose of marketing has documentation that it is
authorized to disclose the PHI).
B. Implications for Individual Choice Models
HIPAA provides a baseline standard of privacy protection for health information. State laws
that offer more stringent privacy protections are allowed by the Privacy Rule, 194 and a
considerable body of privacy law at the state level currently exists.195 As a result, an entity’s
decision regarding potential individual choice models will likely be affected by state privacy
laws. The wide variety in these laws can pose challenges for entities whose goal is to exchange
health information on a regional, or even national, basis. 196 In addition, ARRA amends HIPAA
by expanding its reach, strengthening certain aspects of the regulations, and increasing federal
enforcement tools. 197 Regulations implementing ARRA’s provisions are currently being
promulgated, some of which will affect individual choice models in the context of electronic
exchange.
Certain elements of the Privacy Rule hold particular relevance for analyzing individual choice
models. Because HIPAA has applied only to “covered entities” as defined in the statute, some of
the new entities being created to store, handle, or manage electronic personal health information,
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such as health record banks, have not been directly covered by the Privacy Rule. 198 However,
ARRA has clarified that organizations that provide data transmission of PHI to a covered entity
(or its business associate) and require routine access to PHI are business associates as
contemplated by HIPAA and must enter into business associate contracts with the covered
entity. 199 As a result, exchange entities that meet this description will likely need to execute
business associate agreements with the various covered entities involved in their exchange if
they have not already done so. Additionally, ARRA provides that certain provisions of the
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules will be directly applicable to business associates (in contrast
to previous requirements, under HIPAA, in which business associates were only governed by the
business associates agreements). 200 In the near term, ARRA’s clarification of the business
associate status of these organizations and change in business associate liability may increase
their contracting and administration responsibilities.
Further, ARRA requires the Secretary of HHS to conduct a study and submit a report to
Congress on recommended privacy and security requirements for entities that are not currently
covered under HIPAA. 201 As it has been debated whether ARRA’s interpretation of the business
associate provision as it applies to exchange entities that transmit and require routine access to
PHI includes consumer-facing HIT tools used in health record banks or created by internet
companies such as Microsoft, Google, and WebMD, it is possible that the Secretary’s study will
include such tools in its area of focus.
The Privacy Rule’s minimum necessary requirement also holds particular relevance for an
entity’s selection of individual choice model. The Rule requires covered entities to take
reasonable steps to limit the use or disclosure of, and requests for, PHI to the minimum necessary
to accomplish the intended purpose. 202 However, the requirement does not apply to disclosures
or requests by a health care provider for treatment purposes, or to disclosures to the individual
who is the subject of the information. 203 The purpose of an entity’s information exchange
therefore is critical to the entity’s compliance with the minimum necessary requirement. If an
entity exchanges information for treatment purposes only, its operations would align well with
the requirement. However, if the entity exchanges PHI for purposes more accurately described
as payment or health care operations, such transactions would need to be addressed to ensure
compliance.
Finally, a particular provision in ARRA may affect an entity’s decision regarding choice models
in that it gives individuals the right to request that providers restrict the disclosure of their PHI to
health plans for the purpose of carrying out payment or health care operations. Under HIPAA,
choosing to honor such a request was voluntary; 204 compliance is now mandatory if the PHI
pertains to a health care item or treatment for which the patient paid out-of-pocket in full and if
198
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disclosure is not otherwise required by law. 205 The provision does not apply to disclosures for
treatment purposes or to de-identified information. Thus, for example, if an individual paid cash
for treatment of a sexually transmitted disease, he or she could prohibit disclosure for payment or
health care operations purposes but could not restrict disclosures linked to treatment. In order to
comply with this provision, an exchange could limit the purpose of its effort to treatment only, or
could restrict the entities eligible to receive information through the exchange to health care
providers. Alternatively, an exchange could apply a segmentation mechanism by which a
person’s information could be exchanged for treatment purposes, but not for payment or health
care operations purposes, if he / she so desired and paid for the treatment out-of-pocket in full.
GINA
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) generally prohibits employers
and health insurers from discriminating on the basis of an individual’s genetic information. 206
GINA has two titles: Title I affects group health plans and health insurance, while Title II applies
in the employment context. 207 Title I prevents group health plans and health insurers from
adjusting group premiums based on genetic information, prohibits the use of genetic information
as a basis for determining eligibility or setting premiums in the individual and Medicare
supplemental insurance markets, and limits the ability of group health plans, health insurance
issuers, and Medicare supplemental insurers to collect genetic information or to request or
require that individuals undergo genetic testing. 208 Title II strictly limits an employer’s right to
request, require, or purchase an employee’s genetic information. 209 Although the scope of
GINA’s protection is broad, the law does not apply to benefits such as long-term care, disability,
and life insurance. 210
Pursuant to GINA, interim final rules were recently issued that provide steps for insurers to
follow to ensure that they do not collect genetic information that could be used in
underwriting. 211 In addition, the Office for Civil Rights at HHS issued proposed regulations that
would modify the HIPAA Privacy Rule provisions relating to the use and disclosure of genetic
information. 212 If adopted as issued, the proposed rule would revise HIPAA’s definition of
“health information” explicitly to include genetic information; add a definition of “genetic
information” to the Privacy Rule consistent with GINA’s statutory definition; and prohibit the
use and disclosure of genetic information by HIPAA covered entities for eligibility
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determinations, premium computations, and any other activities related to the creation, renewal,
or replacement of a contract of health insurance or health benefits. 213
As GINA prevents health insurers and employers from requesting or obtaining an individual’s
genetic information, 214 the law has important policy and technical implications for the types of
data an electronic exchange might choose to include, its decisions regarding what entities will
have access to the data, and its decision to use a particular individual choice model. In addition,
GINA defines “genetic information” as information about an individual’s genetic tests, as well as
the genetic tests of an individual’s family members or the manifestation of a disease or disorder
in an individual’s family members. 215 As a result, GINA prevents employers and health insurers
from using family medical histories in employment and insurance decisions, in addition to
genetic information about the individual. 216 If an electronic exchange chooses to include genetic
information, it therefore might need to be capable of sequestering not only an individual’s
genetic information, but also the genetic information and medical history of an individual’s
family members. This ability would be necessary to prevent the disclosure to and use of genetic
information by health insurers and / or employers, but still allow its disclosure to and use by
treating physicians. In practice, even if an electronic exchange were able to segment data in this
fashion, it is likely that organizations will choose, at least in the near term, either to omit genetic
information from their exchange practices, or exclude health insurers and / or employers from
the exchange entirely in order to study developments in the legal doctrine and ensure compliance
with the law.
Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records (Part 2)
In the early 1970’s, Congress passed legislation intended to encourage individuals to seek
treatment for substance abuse. As part of this effort, the federal legislation included provisions
that protect the confidentiality of persons who seek or obtain substance abuse education or
treatment in federally assisted programs. 217 Pursuant to the statutes, federal regulations were
promulgated to protect the identities of persons in alcohol or drug abuse treatment programs, 218
reflecting the view that: “Every patient and former patient must be assured that his right to
privacy will be protected. Without that assurance, fear of public disclosure of drug abuse or of
records that will attach for life will discourage thousands from seeking the treatment they must
have if this tragic national problem is to be overcome.” 219 In keeping with this view, Part 2
strictly limits the allowable disclosure and use of information about individuals in federally
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assisted alcohol or drug abuse treatment programs. 220 Any and all information obtained by such
a program that could reasonably be used to identify an individual who seeks or obtains education
or treatment is protected under Part 2, and all permissible disclosures are limited to information
necessary to carry out the purpose of the disclosure. 221 The regulations do not protect a patient’s
identity per se, but rather his or her identity as a participant in or applicant for substance abuse
treatment. 222
Part 2 defines disclosure as a communication or verification of an individual’s patient identifying
information. 223 “Patient identifying information” includes names, addresses, Social Security
numbers, fingerprints, photographs, or similar information by which the identity of a patient can
be determined. 224 The requirements to protect information under Part 2 apply to individuals or
entities that hold themselves out and actually provide alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment,
or referral for treatment, as well as to medical personnel or staff whose primary function is the
provision of alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment. 225 “Diagnosis”
includes any reference to an individual's alcohol or drug abuse or to a condition that is identified
as having been caused by that abuse, 226 including psychological or social work assessment or
evaluation. Treatment therefore might include counseling as well as medical care. A federally
assisted program could be a freestanding program or a program that is part of a larger
organization—for example, a detoxification unit in a general hospital or a substance abuse clinic
in a county mental health department. 227
Nearly all disclosures allowed under Part 2 require specific patient consent, and a patient consent
form must contain certain required elements to be valid pursuant to the law. 228 However, Part 2
does include certain provisions and exceptions where disclosure is allowed without patient
consent. 229 These include communications within a program or between a program and an entity
having direct administrative control over that program (e.g., the staff of a detoxification unit
within a hospital can share information with hospital administrators where the sharing is needed
to provide substance abuse services to the program’s patients). In addition, communications are
allowed between a program and a qualified service organization (a person or entity that provides
services such as data processing, bill collection, or accounting to a program). 230 Part 2 also
allows disclosure without patient consent in strictly defined circumstances for medical
emergencies; 231 audit or evaluation activities; 232 and scientific research purposes. 233
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The fact that patient identifying information may be disclosed pursuant to one of the exceptions
to the general rule does not mean that the disclosed information is no longer protected by the
regulations. Part 2 generally prohibits anyone who receives information from a substance abuse
program from re-disclosing it, and requires that any information released must be accompanied
by a written notice informing the recipient that federal law prohibits its re-disclosure unless
expressly permitted by the patient or as otherwise authorized by the regulations. 234
Like HIPAA, Part 2 sets a federal privacy floor. Where state laws are less protective regarding
disclosure and use of information about individuals in federally assisted alcohol or drug abuse
treatment programs, Part 2 is operative, and where state laws are more stringent state laws are
preserved. 235 Overall, the vast majority of states essentially have adopted Part 2 as the standard
for protecting this type of health information. 236
Our discussions with experts interviewed for this paper indicated that, in the area of electronic
exchange, Part 2 presents challenges in the development of policies and practices for information
sharing, particularly in the areas of patient consent and granularity of choice. Although the
regulations do allow information sharing under narrow circumstances, and therefore would allow
an electronic exchange some operational leeway, 237 many entities perceive the policies and
technical requirements that would need to be developed as prohibitively complicated. Because
Part 2 generally requires written patient consent for the disclosure of patient-identifying
information that specifies, inter alia, the purpose of the disclosure, who is to receive the
information, and a date or condition upon which the consent expires, an exchange would be
required to develop a means of ensuring and documenting such consent as well as the capability
of managing this type of information in order to comply with the law. 238 According to the
experts we interviewed, it therefore is possible that data covered by Part 2 – or provider
institutions likely to contribute such data – will be excluded from some exchange operations.
In addition, the experts whom we interviewed suggested that the common co-occurrence of
alcohol and drug abuse with mental illness, and the increasing availability of dual diagnosis
treatment programs, might result in mental health diagnosis and treatment that indirectly falls
within the restrictions of Part 2. In practice, for example, it could be difficult to confirm that a
patient treated in a dual diagnosis program is receiving certain medications for depression or
bipolar spectrum disorder, the exchange of which information might otherwise be acceptable
according to federal and state law, but separate other parts of the patient’s diagnosis or treatment
for separate consent procedures. As a result, it is possible that the law could be interpreted by
some to require the segmentation of some, but not all, mental health information within EHRs.
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State Laws
Federal privacy and confidentiality laws do not apply to every entity that holds health
information. HIPAA applies only to covered entities, 239 while GINA’s restrictions apply to
group health plans, health insurers, and employers. 240 The privacy protections in Part 2 apply
only to the disclosure and use of patient records relating to alcohol and substance abuse diagnosis
and treatment that are maintained in connection with alcohol and substance abuse programs that
receive federal assistance. 241 Because these laws do not preempt state laws that provide
protection that is equal to or greater than their standards, state laws related to electronic exchange
are highly relevant to the various choice models.
State privacy and confidentiality laws widely vary. In 2009, the Interstate Disclosure and Patient
Consent Requirements Collaborative published its final report as part of the Health Information
Security and Privacy Collaboration (HISPC). According to the report, states vary greatly in their
requirements for consent and disclosure related to PHI in various electronic exchange
scenarios. 242 The type of information required in the consent process varies from state to
state, 243 as does each state’s interpretation of seemingly similar statutory language. 244 Some
state statutes demonstrate a high degree of complexity when addressing consent and disclosure
of PHI (evidenced by statutes featuring multiple exceptions and detailed descriptions of what
types of PHI are covered by the statute), while other state laws are relatively unsophisticated. 245
In sum, states differ greatly in the way their statutes address PHI types, PHI holders, PHI
receivers, different treatment scenarios, consent processes and forms, and requirements for
HIPAA’s minimum necessary standard. 246 The differences in state laws have resulted in a range
of “consent cultures” across the country that defines the context for electronic exchange.247 The
lack of uniformity is often viewed as one of the most complex challenges of implementing
electronic exchange.
A review of various state laws also reveals that states are moving at different rates when it comes
to implementing statewide electronic exchange programs and addressing related legal barriers to
electronic exchange. 248 Some states have laws that specifically facilitate electronic exchange,
while others have laws originally intended for a paper-based system. 249 Many states also have
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organized state-level electronic exchange initiatives by statute. 250 The following examples
provide a snapshot of the wide variety of state legislation related to electronic exchange, consent
and disclosure requirements, and preferences for particular choice models.
Select State Examples – (See Appendix B) 251
One of the most common types of state legislation related to electronic exchange is a law
facilitating the creation and design of a statewide HIO. Indiana, Delaware, Maryland and Rhode
Island, among others, have all enacted legislation recently that enables the development of a
statewide HIO. 252 In addition to creating statewide HIOs, some of these laws also address
privacy issues. Indiana’s legislation for example, specifies that Indiana’s electronic exchange
must comply with HIPAA. 253 Similarly, the statute creating DHIN mandates that patientspecific health information shall be disclosed only in accordance with the patient’s consent or
best interest to those having a need to know. 254
With regard to individual consent models, many states have laws that specify the model(s) their
electronic exchange will use. A Delaware law, for example, specifies that patients shall be
informed of and may choose to preclude a search of their individual health information in the
DHIN after consultation with their health care provider—in other words, patients are able to opt
out of the query function in the DHIN system. 255 Legislation in Rhode Island provides that
participation in the state’s HIO will be governed by an opt-in system, 256 while a Wisconsin law
establishes a no consent system for the exchange of certain types of health information. 257
Specifically, Wisconsin law allows diagnostic test results (including laboratory data, EKGs, and
radiology reports) to be exchanged without the informed consent of the patient. 258 Previously,
Wisconsin law had only allowed certain elements of a patient’s treatment record (including a
patient’s demographic information, diagnosis, medications, and allergies) to be released without
consent to health care providers in a “related health care entity.” To facilitate electronic
exchange, the new Wisconsin law allows these data, as well as diagnostic test results and
symptoms, to be shared without patient consent with any health care provider involved in a
patient’s care. 259
Interestingly, some states that do not currently have a working electronic exchange system
nevertheless have laws related to electronic exchange. A law in Nevada, for example, which
does not have any form of a statewide HIO, allows individuals to opt out of the electronic
transmission of individually identifiable health information, with exceptions for Medicaid and
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SCHIP patients or when required by HIPAA or state law. 260 In addition, the Nevada legislation
exempts HIPAA covered entities that transmit individually identifiable health information
electronically in compliance with HIPAA provisions from compliance with more stringent state
privacy and confidentiality laws. 261
New York, in particular, has extensive legislation on privacy and disclosure related to electronic
exchange. Section 18 of New York’s Public Health Law requires that hospitals, physicians,
other health care providers, and HMOs obtain written consent before disclosing personal health
information for non-emergency treatment. 262 This law has been interpreted within the state as
being more protective than HIPAA, as it requires patient consent even for treatment, payment,
and health care operations. 263 New York courts analyzing section 18 have interpreted the law to
require any individual, including a government official, who possesses medical records to keep
those records confidential and not to release them to third parties without proper
authorizations. 264
New York law also establishes consequences for the misuse of health information. Under the
New York Education Law, it is professional misconduct for a physician to reveal “personally
identifiable facts, data or information” to a third party without patient consent. 265 The New York
State Department of Health has emphasized that a provider’s disclosure of records without
patient consent could lead to violations under the Education Law, 266 and the New York Codes,
Rules and Regulations further clarify that licensed professionals are prohibited from revealing
personally identifying information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent
of the patient, except as authorized by law. 267
Like New York, Rhode Island has a significant body of law related to electronic exchange. The
Rhode Island Health Information Exchange Act of 2008 establishes a statewide HIO and security
measures that will ensure patients are aware of the exchange and have given permission to share
their data. 268 The law specifies that the HIO is voluntary for both providers and patients and
notes that patients have the right to terminate their participation in the HIO. 269 In addition, the
law provides that patients will be able to obtain reports of what health information has been
shared and who accessed it, as well as notices of security breaches. 270 Another Rhode Island
law, enacted one year after the Rhode Island Health Information Exchange Act, specifies that the
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state’s HIO will be opt-in. 271 In addition, the law lists situations when consent is not required for
the disclosure of health information. For example, consent is not required for the release of
health information to public health authorities for a specified function, to health care providers
for diagnosis or treatment in an emergency, and to the organization for operation and
administrative oversight of the HIO. 272
Finally, electronic exchange legislation in some states includes enforcement clauses for the
misuse of health information. As described above, New York’s Education Law makes it
professional misconduct for a physician to reveal personally identifiable facts, data or
information to a third party without consent. 273 In Delaware, state legislation specifies that any
misuse of DHIN health information or data must be reported to the state Office of the Attorney
General, and that violators will be subject to prosecution and penalties under the Delaware
Criminal Code or federal law. 274
IMPACT OF MODELS
Patient Participation
Many patients want high levels of privacy and autonomy as participants in electronic exchange.
Experience in the Massachusetts pilot program and other state-level exchanges demonstrates that
opt-in models have the capacity to yield high consumer participation rates, but that this
achievement requires a tremendous level of awareness and trust building, as well as education. It
also requires the establishment of multiple options for accommodating preferences with respect
to a consent management process. That said, such models provide great opportunity for patient
engagement and the building of community trust.
When MAeHC needed to select a consent model, policy makers interviewed consumer groups to
gather feedback on privacy and consent options. 275 The groups strongly favored an opt-in
model, and were concerned that an opt-out approach would result in patients inadvertently
opening up their medical information to security risks without their awareness. 276 Based in part
on this feedback from consumers, the MAeHC developers selected an opt-in approach for their
electronic exchange. Since the program’s inception, patient participation rates have been
extremely high—as of March 2009, more than 90 percent of patients had chosen to opt in and
participate in the MAeHC system. 277 It should be noted, however, that the success of the
approach in Massachusetts may be due in part to the relative scale of the effort. The MAeHC
facilitates electronic exchange for three communities, which is less ambitious than many statewide efforts.
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To help it achieve high patient participation rates, MAeHC utilized the services of a professional
marketing firm. Before the MAeHC exchange launched, focus groups identified the issues of
greatest concern for patients, which included privacy, convenience, ease of use, and cost. 278
Marketing efforts were then directed toward working with and through providers, as it was
widely recognized that patients are not likely to trust a system unless their physicians do as
well. 279 Finally, consent for participation in MAeHC was designed to be obtained through a
provider, which had the effect of building a relationship of trust and reassuring the patient that
his / her information was secure.280 All of these strategies proved effective in increasing patient
participation in the MAeHC exchange.
Although MAeHC does not inquire about patients’ reasons for not participating in the exchange,
anecdotal reports from providers suggest that privacy concerns were a factor for some
patients. 281 Another group that did not opt in to the MAeHC exchange consisted of patients who
received their primary care services outside of the community and therefore felt that it was not
worth the risk to make their information available via the exchange. 282 This experience suggests
that, although it may require additional resources and effort, it is possible to engage a large
number of patients in an exchange effort that relies on consent models that offer patients at least
some degree of choice.
Given patient preferences for adequate privacy protections and some level of control with respect
to how their health information is used and exchanged, it follows that consumers might generally
prefer opt-in over opt-out models. As a rough guideline, the amount of information that is shared
in an electronic exchange is inversely proportional to patient participation. 283 However,
researchers have found that default policies, which can be either opt-in or opt-out, influence
behavior in crucial ways. 284 Specifically, patients may believe that defaults are suggestions by
the policy maker, and thus may be reluctant to deviate from what they perceive to be the
recommended action. 285 For example, patients in an opt-out exchange may believe that the
governmental or organizational entity responsible for the exchange strongly recommends
participation. This belief could make patients more reluctant to opt out of the exchange and
deviate from the status quo, which could help to explain, at least in part, why patient
participation rates in opt-out models can be high. In the DHIN, for example, not a single patient
has chosen to opt out of the system, 286 resulting in a 100 percent statewide patient participation
rate. 287
Research on human behavior has revealed some important explanations for why opt-out models
might yield high levels of consumer participation. One reason is simply inertia—making the
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decision to opt out requires effort, whereas accepting the default is effortless. 288 In difficult and
stressful situations, many people choose to avoid decision making altogether and accept the
status quo. In a study in which respondents were asked whether they would be organ donors on
the basis of various conditions (opt-in, opt-out, no prior default), about twice as many
participants elected to donate organs in the opt-out condition compared to those in the opt-in
condition. 289 Researchers have also compared rates of organ donation in European countries
with different default options (opt-in or opt-out) and found that the four opt-in countries studied
had lower organ donation rates than the six opt-out countries. 290 Additionally, a systematic
review of the literature on the impact of consent models on participation rates in observational
health research found that opt-out consent models generally resulted in significantly higher
participation rates than opt-in models. 291 These studies demonstrate that, even in situations
where the stakes for participating in a program are high, rates of patient participation can be high
in opt-out regimes.
Provider Participation
As discussed above, there are two primary drivers to provider participation in electronic
exchange: 1) the requirements of participation cannot be too onerous; and 2) the value that
providers get from the exchange must more than offset the additional process and other burdens
associated with their participation. In essence, provider participation in an electronic exchange
must be worth their while.
Because providers value access to complete clinical information, 292 they typically prefer a
consent model that allows for the exchange of the most complete and comprehensive health
information. The more comprehensive the data, the more useful it is to providers in making
decisions about patient care, and the quicker such decisions can be made. 293 Because opt-out
models usually give providers access to health information for a larger number of patients than
opt-in models, it is likely that many providers would favor this type of consent model.
The DHIN query system, an example of an opt-out model, has achieved high levels of
participation among Delaware health care providers. 294 To date, more than half of providers in
Delaware (60 percent) use DHIN, while more than 85 percent of the state’s laboratory
transactions and more than 80 percent of hospitalizations in Delaware are reported in DHIN. 295
While most providers generally view greater access to clinical information as a benefit, some
have expressed concern regarding participation in electronic exchange efforts because of the
perception that their liability risks could increase due to the potentially greater availability of
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patient health information. 296 For example, during the selection of a consent model for
Maryland’s CRISP exchange, some participating providers were concerned over liability,
particularly as it relates to breaches of privacy laws and medical malpractice. 297 Specifically,
providers wondered whether having more information available in a patient’s medical history
would change the standard of care applicable in the medical malpractice context. Questions
surfaced as to whether, with more information at their fingertips, they would be held to a higher
standard for reviewing and considering all available information in making care decisions. 298
Thus far, attempts to evaluate the impact of electronic exchange of health information on
providers’ medical malpractice liability have found insufficient legal basis on which to make
conclusions. 299 The legal landscape in this area will continue to evolve, however, and is likely to
incorporate advances in technology slowly into the standard of care. 300
Clinical Care
It is widely believed that the ability to exchange health information electronically will lead to a
number of improvements in health care. 301 Such improvements include increasing the ability of
providers to make better clinical decisions based on more complete patient information,
increasing providers’ ability to access vital patient records immediately in the event of an
emergency, decreasing the number of patient tests that need to be repeated because the original
results cannot be located on a timely basis, and lowering the risk of negative drug interactions
because physicians are not aware of a patient’s current medications.302 In a recent GAO report
that explored the impact of electronic exchange on quality of care, providers participating in an
exchange reported a positive impact on patient care and having more timely and comprehensive
patient information available. Through the use of electronic exchange, one provider reported
that the receipt of patient alerts enabled timelier interventions. Similarly, providers in a large
hospital emergency room were able to access critical medical information about patients, thereby
avoiding numerous adverse drug interactions. 303 Although these benefits likely could be realized
with the implementation of any consent model, some model types might require more effort to
achieve the same level of impact.
Opt-in models force patients to be active participants in their health care. This element is
advantageous, because research has shown that when patients are more engaged in their health
care, they have better treatment outcomes. 304 On the other hand, consent models that allow for
the exchange of large amounts of health information, such as opt-out models, have been shown
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to improve continuity of care and communication between patients and providers. 305 This
increased communication leads to greater trust between patients and providers, often resulting in
improvements in clinical care.
Although utilization of electronic exchange should lead to improvements in clinical care,
reliance on EHRs in the clinical setting could, in fact, have unintended negative consequences.
The more information that is available to a clinician via an electronic exchange, the greater the
risk that a rushed physician may actually engage in fewer conversations with patients, and / or
could cut and paste large blocks of text or notes from other physicians into a patient’s record to
save time. 306
Whatever type of consent model is selected, it is vital to all stakeholders that the quality of
patient care does not decline. In a survey of the members of the California Privacy and Security
Advisory Board’s Health Information Exchange Committee, 72 percent of members strongly
agreed that the consent approach chosen by the committee should not impact the quality of
care. 307 One reason given for this view was that the treatment of the patient is more important
than the patient’s individual privacy rights. 308 Although protecting patient privacy and
autonomy through consent models is a worthy goal, many argue that it must not be achieved at
the cost of diminished clinical care.
Quality Improvement, Public Health, and Other Research
A major benefit to implementing a nationwide system of electronic exchange is that health
information could be gathered for quality improvement, public health, and research purposes. In
order to achieve quality improvement, one must have access to measurable information captured
from thousands of transactions. 309 In that respect an opt-out model may be preferable to its optin counterpart, as it likely will include clinical information for a larger percentage of the patient
population.
Best practices are discovered based on analysis of entire populations. Using data mined from
databases of vital signs, images, laboratory values, medications, diseases, interventions, and
patient demographic information, analysts can create guidelines for care in a more effective
manner than by using, for example, a roundtable discussion of experts or a limited evidence
base. 310 For example, a health exchange examined in the recent GAO report merges data from
hospitals, laboratories, providers and health plans to develop metrics related to preventive care
and chronic disease management as part of a quality improvement program designed to assist
providers in adhering to evidence-based practices. 311 An electronic exchange model that allows
for the exchange of a wide variety of clinical information (e.g., laboratory data, radiology
305

Id. at 123.
Hartzband, P. and J. Groopman. “Off the Record – Avoiding the Pitfalls of Going Electronic,” New England
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 358, No. 16, April 17, 2008, pp. 1656-658, at 1656.
307
California Health and Human Services Agency. CalPSAB HIE Committee Consent Survey Results, September 14,
2009. Available at: http://www.ohi.ca.gov/calohi/PSAB/HIECommittee.aspx.
308
Id.
309
D’Avolio, L. W. “Electronic Medical Records at a Crossroads: Impetus for Change or Missed Opportunity?”
JAMA, Vol. 302, No. 10, September 9, 2009, pp. 1109-11, at 1110.
310
Id. at 1110.
311
GAO, supra note 303, at 20.
306

GW SPHHS
Department of Health Policy

55

reports, medication history, etc.) will be the most useful in collecting data for quality
improvement purposes.
According to the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS), EHRs must be
designed with quality reporting requirements in mind in order to produce comparative quality
data effectively. 312 Currently, the lack of standard definitions for quality measurements and their
underlying data elements is a barrier to the effective use of reporting initiatives. 313 To be useful
for quality reporting purposes, EHRs must be able to capture relevant clinical data using
standardized definitions for data and quality measures. 314 NCVHS also specifies that, in order to
receive incentive payments from HITECH, “providers will need to collect specific clinical data
to build quality of care reports.” 315 An electronic exchange system designed to collect a wide
variety of health information from a large percentage of the population will help providers build
these quality of care reports.
Mining data through an electronic exchange system also has the potential to reap large public
health benefits. If the information exchanged is made available to public health agencies for the
purpose of identifying disease outbreaks and long-term population health threats, tremendous
strides can be made in the field of public health. The more information that can be accessed, the
better, and the ability to access clinical information in real time is also critical so that public
health officials can respond to outbreaks and threats quickly. 316 For example, the recent GAO
report offers the example of an exchange that connected its hospitals to the state’s public health
department, allowing for real-time reporting of conditions and detection of disease outbreaks.
According to the exchange, this system enabled the state to obtain information regarding H1N1
cases more quickly than other states. 317
Networking electronic databases together on a regional or national level increases the power to
improve health care exponentially. 318 Regional networks of databases can be used to identify
outbreaks or infections, or to highlight differences in patient care from one hospital to the
next. 319 An HIO that makes genomic information, environmental factors, and family history
accessible in its database would also enable clinicians to engage in personalized medicine. 320
The opportunity to realize public health benefits through electronic exchange is vast. Potential
public health use cases for electronic exchange include the mandated reporting of laboratory
diagnoses and physician-based diagnoses, public health investigation (in which a health
department investigator would query an HIO for additional information on a previously reported
disease or outbreak), antibiotic-resistant organ surveillance, and using electronic exchange to
monitor the prevalence of diseases like diabetes, heart disease, and colon cancer and their quality
312
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metrics (rates of colonoscopy, mammograms) across a community. 321 One of the exchanges
highlighted in the recent GAO report has begun working with the local public health department
to create metrics related to health conditions prevalent in the community, such as the percentage
of each provider’s eligible patients who have been screened for cancer or received appropriate
immunizations. 322 Consent models that allow for a wide variety of data types to be collected
from the majority of the population seem to be best for realizing improvements to public health.
In addition to potential uses in public health research, data mined from electronic exchange
databases can be used for a broad array of other research purposes, which possibility raises a
number of privacy and consent issues. In its report on privacy and health research published in
February 2009, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recommended changes to the standard of
obtaining patient consent before using data for research. 323 Specifically, the report recommends
that Congress authorize HHS and other federal agencies to develop new standards for protecting
privacy in health research that would apply uniformly to all health research. 324 IOM further
recommended that, after the new standards have been implemented, all health research should
be exempt from the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 325 The report also proposes an approach in which
programs or institutions could be certified by HHS or another accrediting body to qualify for
“safe harbor” protection from regulation. 326 Certified entities would then be permitted to
“collect and analyze personally identifiable health information for clearly defined and approved
purposes, without individual consent.” 327 Finally, in situations where personally identifiable
health information is needed for research and researchers cannot use data with direct identifiers
removed, approval by an “ethics oversight board” would be required. 328
IOM’s proposal to dispense with the informed consent requirement in clinical research has
naturally drawn criticism. 329 Instead of enhancing privacy, critics charge that the report seems to
suggest that health research can be improved by relaxing privacy protections. In the electronic
exchange context, the proposal could be interpreted to mean that patients would not need to
provide consent for their health information to be used in certain research situations. The IOM
report is merely a proposal, however, and has yet to manifest in any regulatory action.
Disparities
An important consideration in selecting an electronic exchange choice model is the extent to
which it will impact – either positively or negatively – racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic health
disparities. The Summit Health Institute for Research and Education (SHIRE) recently identified
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several barriers to reducing disparities in HIT adoption. 330 These barriers include disparate
access to technology required for HIT use, lack of culturally / linguistically appropriate outreach,
lack of capital investment in HIT and HIT sustainability, trust issues surrounding privacy, and
lack of participation by minority stakeholders. 331
An electronic exchange model that relies on the internet to obtain patient consent and / or
educate patients about consent options could have a negative effect on racial and ethnic health
disparities, as minority populations have less access to such technologies than other populations.
Statistics show that 73 percent of white adults use the internet compared to 61 percent of African
Americans, and that 68 percent of whites but only 50 percent of African Americans have a home
computer. 332 Further, health disparities could persist if communities without access to
broadband technology continue to experience this lack of essential infrastructure for electronic
exchange. 333
In addition to decreased access to online resources, African Americans report higher levels of
distrust in health providers and health care systems than their white counterparts. 334 As a result,
African Americans may perceive privacy threats related to online health records and electronic
exchange systems differently, and might be more likely to opt out of electronic exchange.
Studies examining disparities related to PHRs and electronic exchange have yielded varying
results. A two-year study of Georgia Kaiser Permanente enrollees found lower rates of
participation in a Kaiser Permanente PHR system among African Americans (30.1 percent) than
among whites (41.7 percent). 335 In addition, those with postgraduate education were more likely
to register in the PHR system (44.4 percent) than adults with a high school education or less
(24.4 percent). 336 Researchers in the Kaiser study concluded that, because racial and ethnic
minorities and those with lower education, advanced age, and rural addresses have decreased
access to information technology, PHRs also have the potential to widen disparities in health
care. 337
In contrast, results from the Massachusetts pilot program (an opt-in model), revealed virtually no
disparities in participation among the three sites in the pilot study, although each site had a very
different socioeconomic makeup. 338 One reason for the lack of disparities in the Massachusetts
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pilots could be the program’s sophisticated direct-to-consumer marketing effort, which focused
on reaching patients through their clinicians instead of over the internet.339
Regardless of the consent model chosen, care must be taken to ensure that existing health care
disparities are not exacerbated, and to make progress toward their reduction. These goals can be
accomplished by working to ensure that essential infrastructure components are available to
support a broad range of populations involved in electronic exchange, by increasing and
diversifying community outreach and education efforts, and by working to ensure that the
specific needs and concerns of minority populations are addressed adequately through the
policies and practices of an exchange.
METHODS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
As described throughout this whitepaper, the development of policies regarding consent
requirements can be a vexing challenge for the establishment of successful electronic exchange,
especially with regard to sensitive information. Some stakeholders have argued that the federal
government should establish policies regarding consent that would preempt the field and set one
uniform national standard that all organizations engaging in electronic exchange would be
required to follow. Others have argued that state law should establish consent principles with
regard to general consent, specific conditions, interstate information exchange, information
exchange with employers and purchasers, use of information for marketing, and waivers of
consent in public health emergencies and when a patient’s life is at risk. Arguments have also
been made for the adoption by the entire health care industry of a standardized or uniform patient
consent form and process. 340
In essence, the many stakeholders in electronic exchange are actively seeking ways to simplify
the questions surrounding the issue of consent. From a policymaking viewpoint, there are a
variety of possible vehicles to use in approaching that goal. Each method, of course, has both
advantages and disadvantages, and the methods themselves could have varying effects on the
availability of and benefits / burdens calculation relating to possible consent models. This
section briefly discusses some of the available tools and possible effects of their use in three
large categories: 1) federal legislative and regulatory options; 2) state-driven methods; and 3)
voluntary approaches.
Federal Legislative and Regulatory Approach
In order to achieve consistency across states in privacy law and practices related to consent,
thereby facilitating regional, and even national, electronic exchange, Congress could enact a
uniform federal privacy law that preempts conflicting state laws. Adopting a uniform law would
provide immediate homogeneity and consistency across states. The approach could also include
the creation of a standard consent form for electronic exchange. 341
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A major drawback of adopting a preemptive federal law, however, is the length of time needed to
enact such legislation. In addition, the fact that there is no general consensus on the ideal level
of individual consent in electronic exchange among exchange entities, let alone the country,
would increase the time and, indeed, the realistic possibilities for a law to be enacted. Finally,
adopting a uniform federal law would not prevent statewide variations in interpreting and
implementing that law, as has occurred in the case of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 342
History has shown, however, that if Congress chooses to pass a sweeping law, its
implementation can be accomplished quickly. In 1964, for example, Congress passed Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits the provision of federal funds to organizations or programs
that engage in racial segregation. 343 In order to desegregate hospitals without delay, Congress
conditioned the receipt of Medicare funds on compliance with the anti-discrimination provisions
of Title VI. 344 Because hospital solvency depends heavily on Medicare payments, they were in
essence forced to choose between compliance with the law and bankruptcy. Nationwide
compliance with Title VI was immediate. In less than four months, more than 1,000 hospitals
had integrated their medical staffs, waiting rooms, and hospital floors; by 1966, over 92 percent
of all American hospitals were integrated. 345
The Medicare Title VI experience is an extraordinary example of rapid implementation of and
compliance with a federal law. In that case, the venture succeeded because: 1) its financial
incentives were strong and unambiguous; 2) all hospitals across the nation were subject to the
same financial pressure; 3) the effort was forward-looking and no sanctions were involved; and
4) the goal of Title VI – dismantling racial segregation – was visible and easily verifiable. 346
Lessons from the Title VI experience are instructive in analyzing the feasibility and / or likely
success of enacting and implementing a uniform federal law regarding consent in electronic
exchange.
Rather than enacting federal legislation that would preempt state privacy laws explicitly,
Congress instead could enact legislation that would permit exchange entities to share personal
health information for treatment purposes according to defined consent parameters and only
under certain conditions. 347 An advantage of this approach is that it would also create uniformity
across states, while a disadvantage is the possibility of duplicative consent requirements (or
requirements where none previously existed) if the requirements under federal law differ from
those provided by state law. 348
An alternative to the federal legislative approach is implementation of electronic exchange
policies regarding consent through federal rulemaking. Generally, in notice and comment
rulemaking, an administrative agency first publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking in the
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Federal Register. 349 Interested persons then have the opportunity to submit comments on the
proposed rule, which the agency considers before adopting and publishing a final rule. 350 In
addition to publishing new rules, agencies also have the option to use the rulemaking process to
modify or clarify existing regulations (e.g., revisions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule currently being
promulgated pursuant to the HITECH Act). Although federal rulemaking would establish
uniformity across states and can sometimes be a swifter process than enacting federal legislation,
it too can be time-consuming and generally requires political consensus as to the goals of the
regulation.
A separate option within the federal rulemaking sphere is negotiated rulemaking, in which a
negotiation process takes place before an agency issues a proposed regulation. 351 In negotiated
rulemaking, the agency convenes a committee of interested parties and agency staff who meet
publicly to negotiate a proposed rule. 352 If the committee reaches a consensus, the agency uses
the agreement as a basis for its proposed rule and proceeds according to the notice and comment
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.353 Although negotiated rulemaking is designed
to decrease the delays endemic to the rulemaking process, some scholars claim that these
reductions are actually minimal. 354 Negotiated rulemaking does, however, have one major
benefit: interested stakeholders are present from the beginning of the discussions and have a
concrete role in shaping policy.
State-Driven Approach
Policy vehicles for addressing consent requirements in electronic exchange also abound at the
state level. For example, in order to harmonize state health information disclosure laws, thereby
facilitating the sharing of patient information across state lines, state laws could be amended
based on a “trading partner” basis, where neighboring states or medical markets develop a plan
for resolving differences. 355 To facilitate a trading partner framework, a federally-designated
organization could be established to coordinate and support the effort. 356 Although this approach
would help to resolve differences in regions that would directly benefit from reconciling state
privacy approaches, it is unlikely that amending state laws would fully resolve variations among
states. 357
Alternatively, an interstate compact approach could be used to provide a consistent and
potentially nationwide approach for addressing what consent law or policy applies to interstate
exchange. 358 As discussed by the HISPC Intrastate and Interstate Consent Policy
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Options Collaborative, development of an interstate compact might be approached in a number
of different ways:
1. A “reciprocity” or “choice of law” approach, according to which member states would
decide in advance that either the consent laws of the state requesting health information
or those of the state receiving information would prevail when PHI is exchanged between
member states;
2. A “harmonization” approach, according to which such a compact would set forth agreedupon consumer consent rules or laws that would apply to member states and that would
supersede existing, contradictory consent laws or rules; or
3. An approach wherein the structure of a compact would be determined by the policy
leaders and stakeholders developing the compact. 359
Another policy implementation option at the state level would be to amend state privacy laws to
reduce variation among them regarding specific types of disclosures. 360 For example, national
reference guidelines could be adopted to alleviate inconsistencies among states without using the
harsh measure of preempting state law. Such guidelines, as well as a similar vehicle, model
codes, have been successful historically in regulating certain areas. 361 However, model codes
typically take at least three years to develop, and more time might be needed to draft a model law
that takes into account various state approaches. 362 Finally, because states would remain free to
adopt and modify any model law, differences between states would likely persist. 363
States could also allow the sharing of defined types of personal health information based on a
uniform consent requirement. 364 For instance, the HISPC Interstate Disclosure and Patient
Consent Requirements Collaborative found that about half of the eleven states surveyed permit
the disclosure of certain types of data without consent for non-emergency treatment. 365 Use
cases could be developed for the purpose of analysis in which specific data types, such as
diagnoses, procedures, and medication records, are exchanged without consent to determine
which state laws would permit specific data holders to participate in electronic exchange.
Similar analyses using different data types and data holders could give insight into segments of
electronic exchange that face the fewest state law barriers. As a result, exchange priorities could
be shaped based on the types of data exchange that are most feasible.
Finally, the development of regional or national electronic exchange could be approached within
the existing framework of state laws. One possibility within this framework is to develop a
database that documents each state’s requirements regarding when disclosure of patient data can
be accomplished without consent and, if consent is required, what elements must be satisfied. 366
Such a database could be used to create electronic exchange approaches that actively manage
359
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state variations in consent requirements. Technical vendors could be enlisted to increase the
capability of the rules database even further, allowing its incorporation as a functioning consent
and disclosure management component of interstate electronic exchange networks. 367 If
successful, electronic exchange systems could access the database in real time to automate
disclosure decisions, reconcile consent requirements, and generate compliant consent forms for a
particular disclosure situation.
The options outlined above could allow for identification and resolution of divergent consent and
disclosure requirements among states, and would also offer states flexibility to align with new
federal developments. The creation of a sophisticated database might present cost and technical
barriers, however, in addition to requiring an entity to host and maintain the online rules database
and update it as state laws change.
Voluntary Compliance
Finally, various systems of voluntary compliance could be used to set consent standards for
electronic exchange at both the state and federal level. For example, voluntary compliance could
be achieved through the use of model codes or best practices, or through other options including
procurement, accreditation, connectivity requirements, or pledges of support for a particular
approach.
As previously discussed, model codes or reference guidelines historically have been a successful
means of policy implementation. In the health care arena, both plaintiffs and defendants in
medical malpractice litigation regularly rely upon clinical practice guidelines, 368 and the
implementation of clinical practice guidelines in medicine has had positive quality improvement
results. 369 In 1985, for example, anesthesiologists developed practice guidelines aimed at
reducing preventable harm to patients. After implementation of the guidelines, the risk of death
from anesthesia dropped from one in 5,000 to about one in 250,000. 370 Today, it is estimated
that more than 1,400 sets of clinical practice guidelines exist across medical specialties. 371 A
national model code or guidelines for implementing electronic exchange therefore might be
successfully used to set standards, establish policy, and achieve uniformity in exchange models
across states.
Alternatively, implementation of consent policies in electronic exchange could be achieved
through “best practices” rulemaking, which occurs when regulated entities themselves develop
practices to comply with fairly broad regulatory requirements. 372 In best practices rulemaking,
descriptions of successful practices are submitted to an administrative agency by regulated
entities, and the “best” practices are then selected and publicized. Although the practices are
never mandated explicitly by central administrators, they have proven to be effective in
harmonizing action among regulated entities. 373
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Best practices rulemaking is well suited for situations when a standard administrative scheme
across jurisdictions is desirable, 374 offers low administrative cost, and can mobilize private
parties to action through its strong compliance pull. In short, best practices rulemaking can be a
flexible, informal method of policy implementation, but ultimately is not open to enforcement.
Another disadvantage of the model is that it often produces only common practices rather than
ideal ones. Instead of the “right” regulatory program being adopted, the first ones to be
submitted and publicized often are implemented. Because the use of best practices depends on
replication, regulators in such a regime could be susceptible to cascades and other network
effects. 375 As a result, experts have suggested that best practices rulemaking should only be used
as long as Congress can provide supervision (which does not currently exist under law), or as
long as regulators can ensure that the best practices are publicized and subject to informal
comment by interested parties. 376
Several federal departments and agencies have successfully used best practices as a means of
regulation, including the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its
efforts to regulate water pollution. 377 Specifically, the EPA has encouraged states to develop
best practices voluntarily by making funding available to the states that do so. 378 The EPA
collects best practices from participating states, and consolidates information from successful
best practices in a database of success stories.379 Although the EPA’s best practice program is
not mandatory, it has been extraordinarily effective because of its link to federal funds. To date,
every state has participated in the program. 380
Finally, there are several forms of voluntary compliance that could be implemented immediately
by the federal or state governments. Exchange entities could be regulated via public
procurement, which would involve, for example, building specific requirements into government
contracts for electronic exchange. Alternatively, the federal or a state government could oversee
or implement a program that conditions accreditation of exchange entities on complying with
and implementing specific requirements. A similar approach could be taken in the future by
mandating requirements for national electronic exchange connectivity. Finally, the federal and /
or state governments simply could promote compliance by encouraging entities to serve as
model corporate citizens by pledging their support for a chosen electronic exchange approach.
Implications
As discussed above, the political and operational feasibility of various methods of policy
implementation widely varies. On a more fundamental level, however, the method chosen to
pursue goals in public policy can have a profound effect on the consent models that are available
for use by exchange entities.
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For example, should federal policy makers choose to support a no consent model through statute
or regulation, electronic exchange at all levels could continue as currently operating (unless such
a policy disallowed more restrictive consent models, such as opt-out or opt-in). That is, state
laws and regulations would remain in force and the only federal restrictions relevant to electronic
exchange would reside in current law (e.g., HIPAA, GINA, Part 2, etc.).
On the other hand, a federal statute or regulations that require use of an opt-out model of consent
in electronic exchange would preempt state laws that support systems that do not require patient
action at all (i.e., no consent models). Such systems (e.g., IHIE, DHIN results delivery function)
would be required to change their practices in the absence of applicable state law. Depending on
the details of the federal requirement, whatever granularity level is mandated by the federal
policy would thereafter be required of every entity participating in electronic exchange.
Federal law requiring use of an opt-in model of consent would preempt state law regarding
systems that do not require patient action at all, as well as laws supporting the use of opt-out
models (e.g., DHIN query function, CRISP, CareSpark). Such a policy would also mandate the
use of opt-in models by all exchange entities even in the absence of state law. If an exchange
entity currently includes information in a system before offering patients the ability to opt-out,
any further use of that information would likely be blocked before seeking patients’ affirmative
consent. Again, depending on the details of the federal mandate, any particular granularity level
could be required.
Voluntary compliance measures implemented by the federal government, however, could induce
desired results across the board, regardless of the particular consent model at issue. Such
measures could require state-led entities and other exchanges to act within certain parameters in
order to receive various federal benefits (e.g., accreditation, incentive payments); could support
the adoption of model laws or practice guidelines; or could simply entreat state-led entities and /
or other exchanges to use a particular consent model through the use of consensus-building (the
“bully pulpit” method).
The effects of policy implementation at the state level with regard to consent models are
substantially similar, except that states only have the legal power to mandate action within their
geographic boundaries and cannot contradict superseding federal law. State laws supporting the
use of no consent models would essentially maintain the status quo; laws mandating use of an
opt-out model would require entities to develop compliant policies; and laws requiring use of an
opt-in model would demand alteration of the practices of all entities currently using no consent
or opt-out models. The methods available to states in the area of voluntary compliance are also
similar to those available at the federal level. States could place requirements on the receipt of
public funds to support electronic exchange, as well as develop less exacting methods of
voluntary compliance, such as practice guidelines and model governance structures.
Because utilization of various methods of policy implementation at the state and federal levels
can have such clear-cut effects on operational exchange entities, including those established
pursuant to state law and those whose existence pre-dated federal investment and involvement in
electronic exchange, policy makers at every level must remain cognizant of the high costs that
such actions should entail. The benefits and burdens of potential actions must be assessed
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carefully for their economic, human, and systemic costs. That said, however, such a wide variety
of implementation methods exist that we cannot allow fear of possible consequences to paralyze
policy decision making.
RECOMMENDATIONS / CONCLUSIONS
The choice of which patient consent model to apply for the purposes of electronic exchange will
have immediate implications for a variety of stakeholders, and possibly longer-term
consequences for our national HIT goals—improving the quality, safety, and efficiency of care
while reducing disparities; engaging patients and families in their care; promoting public and
population health; and promoting the privacy and security of EHRs. 381
Patients, providers, payers, HIOs, and other participants in electronic exchange efforts all have
something at stake in individual choice model decisions. Complicating the matter further is the
fact that the issue of consent is multifaceted and not easily isolated from other important policy
decisions. For example, a patient’s perspective on participation in electronic exchange may
depend considerably on the determination of who can access his / her data, under what
circumstances, for what purposes, etc. Similarly, the extent to which HIOs have access to
financial resources and support from the provider community likely will impact their willingness
to entertain consent models that allow for greater patient choice. Add to this the highly variable
and contextual legal, cultural, and political circumstances surrounding such decisions, and it
becomes clear why consent to electronic exchange has become such an important and often
polarizing issue.
This tension generally can be characterized in two dimensions: one that pertains to respecting the
interests of individuals (e.g., patients, providers) as well as those of society as a whole (e.g.,
reduced health care costs and health disparities), and another that pertains to considering the
often divergent interests of the various stakeholders relative to one another. As previously
discussed, an example of the former dimension is the possible scenario in which – due, perhaps,
to the selection of an opt-in model – data on very few patients are made available via electronic
exchange for treatment or public health surveillance purposes. On the other hand, an example of
the latter might be that, in order to honor patient preferences for sequestering whatever data they
deem sensitive, significant resources are expended by participating provider organizations or an
exchange entity to develop and sustain a preference management system. Although there is no
“right” answer to this dilemma, whatever solution is applied in a given context should take into
account the most relevant (to the particular exchange environment) factors in both of these
dimensions.
Given the highly variable contexts in which electronic exchange efforts are emerging, it also
makes sense to weigh external factors that, although not directly related to patient consent, have
a notable impact on the issue. The best example of this is the presence or absence of laws,
regulations, and other mechanisms for consumer protection. Unless, for example, the practice of
using consumer health information as a basis for financial and other discrimination is prohibited,
then the importance of incorporating greater trust and protection elements into the exchange
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environment could outweigh other competing considerations. In essence, where broader
systemic protections fail, an HIO or other governance entity may need to assume more
responsibility for assuring the privacy and security of patient information.
This contextual diversity also makes it challenging to develop a set of specific recommendations
that would apply to all electronic exchange efforts. While it may be tempting to suggest that one
consent model should apply to all electronic exchanges, or that all exchanges should be required
to do “XYZ,” to do so would disregard completely the diversity in stakeholder preferences, and
the unique contextual elements of each electronic exchange entity (e.g., the type of information
exchanged, the process by which consent is obtained, the resources available to support the
effort). On the other hand, it can be useful to articulate some higher-level principles and / or
recommendations that could help guide decision makers in the midst of establishing active
electronic exchange initiatives. At this particular juncture, with more than $560 million in
HITECH funds dedicated to helping states develop electronic exchange capabilities within and
across jurisdictions, 382 it is an appropriate time for the provision of guidance. Absent some level
of direction, the concern, articulated by more than one expert interviewed for this whitepaper, is
that each exchange effort will expend vast amounts of time, energy and resources determining its
own particular approach to consent. There is some acknowledgement that we have neither time
nor resources to waste, so interventions that could generate greater collaboration and efficiency,
along with investments to support the generation of additional evidence, would be welcome.
One possible suggestion for helping to further these consent deliberations would be to encourage
decision makers at all levels to apply compensatory measures to help offset the imposition placed
upon some stakeholders by the decision to implement a particular consent model. This approach
would mean, for example, that if policy makers (at various levels) implement an opt-out
approach, they might also want to consider:
1. Development and active provision of clear and highly-accessible education materials for
patients;
2. Provision of a relatively permissive and simple vehicle for patient opt out,
3. Provision of at least one type of granularity option;
4. Establishment of more comprehensive or stringent systemic patient privacy and
confidentiality protections; and / or
5. Provision and enforcement of strong oversight and accountability measures.
It is also worthwhile to point out a few higher-level policy issues of direct relevance to the
choice model debate. The first concerns the rapidly evolving federal policy landscape,
particularly the anticipated clarification of regulatory language in the HIPAA Privacy Rule that
is required by ARRA. Chief among these are guidance that the Secretary of HHS is required to
establish on the minimum necessary standard, 383 and a study of the current HIPAA de-identification
provisions. 384 Clearly, efforts to clarify how much information is the minimum necessary in the
context of electronic exchange and to strengthen the de-identification standards in HIPAA may
have implications for and inform electronic exchange choice model deliberations. In addition,
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while the issue is not directly addressed by ARRA in areas other than marketing, many health
care stakeholders have long advocated for clarification of the definition of “health care
operations.” 385 Given that each of these issues potentially could impact exchange decisions
regarding appropriate consent models, it seems wise to coordinate broader policy debates
regarding these areas of regulatory change with those regarding choice models.
The second area pertains to the tremendous opportunity for coordinated learning that exists
through the health information exchange grants and technical assistance planned by HHS
pursuant to the requirements of HITECH. Through the HISPC process, numerous state-level
decision makers were able to take advantage of collaboration, peer-to-peer learning and technical
assistance from experts. It now seems evident that there is at least some desire for additional
direction and support from the federal government, both to ensure compliance with relevant laws
and regulations and to generate greater efficiency and expedite what has been a lengthy process.
Such direction could be provided in the form of clear and consistent information and tools that
can be used by state health information exchange grantees to ensure that the full range of issues
and options with respect to consent are explored.
A third, and far more specific, area for consideration pertains to the need for greater evidence to
inform and support those tasked with making choice model decisions. At present, there are far
too few active electronic exchanges to generate such data, and those that exist vary considerably
in almost every aspect. Further, the stakes are so high and the level of necessary resources so
great that it is even difficult to summon the will required to test a number of different models to
see which one works best. While we acknowledge the challenges associated with determining
the real impact of various consent models on such important outcomes as provider participation,
patient engagement, and public health, it seems likely that there are surrogate markers that could
be evaluated at least to provide policy makers with some level of evidence regarding the true (as
opposed to surmised) advantages and disadvantages of various consent models. One such
example might be to conduct studies regarding the effectiveness and desirability of providers
themselves acting as the party responsible for obtaining and managing consent. A variation on
this theme could involve studies that compare the effectiveness of different types of providers
(i.e., nurses, staff assistants, physicians) as consent managers. Although it may not be possible
to conduct such inquiries using data from operating electronic exchange entities, analogous
studies could be conducted regarding general consent to information exchange in the treatment
context.
Ultimately, the data we need to assess the real-life costs, benefits, and impacts of various consent
models in electronic exchange do not currently exist. If we are to move beyond this point in the
discussion, we must develop the political will among stakeholders and policy makers to study
these issues more deliberately. In the absence of such data, policy makers will be forced to make
hard choices in the face of factual uncertainty. While this scenario is by no means new or
unique, unintended consequences in the area of electronic exchange concern patients’ most
personal information. Until the time when we are confident that we can protect such information
in a systematic and thorough way, prudent use of the mechanism of consent appears to be one of
the most reliable ways to pursue that goal.
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APPENDIX A

State-Led Examples of Exchange in the U.S.
State
DE

Consent Model and Related Data Sharing Information
Type of Consent Model: Combination of No Consent (results delivery) and Opt-Out
(query function) for the Delaware Health Information Exchange (DHIN).
The DHIN has two functions:
1. Results delivery function—all patient laboratory data, radiology reports, and
hospital admissions, discharge, and transfer data (ADT data) is uploaded into the
system.
 There is no patient consent component to this function, so all laboratory,
radiology, and ADT data captured on a patient after May 2007 is
automatically included in the system.
2. Query function—allows providers to query the system to obtain specific data on a
patient.
 Patients may choose to opt out of the query function, which effectively
blocks all providers from accessing the patient’s data in the system. To date,
no patients in the state of Delaware have chosen to opt out of the query
function, meaning that the entire population of Delaware is currently in the
exchange.
There is no form of granular consent for DHIN, meaning that patients are either all in or all
out.
Type of Information Exchanged: DHIN began distributing clinical laboratory test results,
radiology reports, and admission face sheets (containing admission, discharge, and transfer
data) from hospitals and laboratories statewide in May 2007. In January 2010, DHIN
expects to add PACS data to the system, which would allow a provider to view a patient’s
radiology images (x-rays, etc.) through a link in radiology reports. In the near future, DHIN
expects to include a patient’s 90-day medication history of prescriptions filled.
Obtaining Data and / or Consent: At the point of care, a provider must educate a patient
on DHIN and the opt-out procedure. DHIN offers providers talking points, sample privacy
language and confidentiality forms to help providers educate patients. Patients can also
visit the DHIN website for more information. If a patient chooses to opt out of DHIN, he /
she must have a form signed by a provider or notary public (to validate the patient’s
identity) and return the form to DHIN. This action automatically blocks the data of certain
high profile government officials (e.g., Joe Biden) from queries.
Patient Rights and / or Durability of Consent: Patients may opt out of the exchange at
any time. If a person decides to opt out, his / her data remains in the system (and is
continually collected by the results delivery function) but providers are blocked from
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State

Consent Model and Related Data Sharing Information
viewing the data. There are no requirements for how often (if at all) consent is to be
discussed / revisited (only applicable if the patient has exercised his / her right to opt out).
Theoretically, a provider could discuss consent once (if at all) with a patient, and then never
again.
Other Related Details: More than half the providers in Delaware (60%) now use DHIN.
Over 85% of lab transactions in the state go through the system, and more than 80% of
hospitalizations are reported in it.
DHIN contains a relatively sophisticated security system. Providers are only able to access
records of current patients, and must “break glass” (list reason for viewing a patient’s
records and establish a time frame for viewing data) to obtain data on a patient they have
not yet treated. Providers can also set the security so that only certain staff members can
access the system.

IN

DHIN routinely conducts audits to ensure that the system is being used correctly, and
revokes privileges of providers who misuse DHIN. A patient has the right to obtain an
audit report from DHIN of providers who have accessed their records.
Type of Consent Model: No Consent required for the Indiana Health Information
Exchange (IHIE). (Federally funded substance abuse treatment programs do not provide
data to the HIO.)
Participating hospitals describe uses of the data in their privacy policies and a provider must
suppress the data if a patient requests that his / her information not be shared.
Type of Information Exchanged: Types of data eligible for exchange include: labs,
pathology, radiology, electrocardiogram reports, ER info, hospital encounter info,
transcriptions, medication history, discharge summaries, allergies / immunization, tumor
registry, ambulatory appointment data, claims processing, and prescription data (dispensing
evaluation).
In 1994, with funding from the National Institutes of Health and the National Library of
Medicine, Regenstrief Institute Medical Informatics extended the Regsenstrief Medical
Record System (RMRS) to the Indiana Network for Patient Care (INPC), a city-wide
clinical informatics network. Five INPC hospital systems in Indianapolis (Community
Hospitals Indianapolis, St. Vincent Hospitals and Health Services, St. Francis Hospital and
Health Centers, Clarian Health, and Wishard Health Services) operate a total of 11 different
hospital facilities and more than 100 geographically-distributed clinics and day surgery
facilities. Collectively, these systems admit 165,878 patients, and serve more than 390,000
emergency room visits and 2.7 million clinic visits per year.
All INPC participants now deliver registration records, all laboratory tests, and all UB92
records (diagnosis, length of stay, and procedure codes) for hospital admissions and
emergency room visits to separate electronic medical record vaults in a central INPC server
located at Wishard Hospital. The computer system standardizes all clinical data as it arrives
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at the INPC vault, laboratory test results are mapped to a set of common test codes
(LOINC) with standard units of measure, and patients with multiple medical record
numbers are linked. Each institution has the same file structure and shares the same term
dictionary which contains the codes, names (and other attributes) for tests, drugs, coded
answers, etc. When a patient is seen in any of the 11 emergency rooms operated by the
consortium hospitals, and the patient consents, the information from all of these institutions
about one patient can be presented as one virtual medical record.
Obtaining Data and / or Consent: Data is only used for purposes allowed under HIPAA.
Patient Rights and / or Durability of Consent: Data is only used for purposes allowed
under HIPAA.
Other Related Details: To gain access to the exchange, providers must be authenticated to
the system. Types of HIE services offered in Indiana include:
1. A clinical messaging service that delivers test results from labs to the doctor’s
office;
2. A patient look-up service; and
3. A quality metrics and reporting service, where the data are used for quality
purposes

MD

A patient's data is maintained in separate "vaults" or clinical data repositories by the
institution until one of the allowed uses is triggered. Then, the patient's data are merged
virtually. The triggers are highly specific and tightly controlled.
Type of Consent Model: Opt-Out (though it functions as an opt-in) for the Chesapeake
Regional Information System for Our Patients (CRISP; http://www.crisphealth.org/).
By default, all patients will be notified about the existence of CRISP and will be in the
exchange unless they opt out of exchange participation. Even if patients opt out, a certain
amount of basic patient demographic information will still technically reside in the
exchange, but in a separate data repository used for the master patient index. Other basics
include:
1. No “break the glass” provisions to obtain information for a non-participant (an
individual who has opted out) will be permitted, and CRISP does not
recommend granular control for exclusion by data type or provider organization;
2. Hospitals and other providers will be permitted to allow patients greater control
over which of their records are published to the exchange; and
3. Health record banks (HRB) and personal health records (PHRs) will be an
exception to the all-in or all-out principle. A patient will have the option of
excluding himself / herself from the exchange for every other purpose, while
still allowing information to flow from an HRB to a healthcare provider. This
feature of the HIE is designed for patients desiring more granularity than an allout option.
Type of Information Exchanged: Two pilot efforts are currently operational:
One in Baltimore involves the exchange of medication history between a few hospitals.
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The other is in Montgomery County and involves the exchange of certain clinical data (not
full CCR) between a few hospitals.
The state has mapped out 20 use cases and will build up capacity to eventually roll out each
one statewide. The purpose for data exchange is treatment, but there are secondary uses of
the data—including biosurveillance and public health.
Obtaining Data and / or Consent: Patients will be able to opt out of the exchange,
becoming a non-participant, by calling a toll-free phone number and requesting to be
excluded. Patients may enroll via phone or direct contact with a provider (e.g., use of a
form), and can also choose to participate at the point of care.
HRBs and PHRs are exceptions to the all-in or all-out principle. By using an HRB, a patient
has the option of excluding himself or herself from the exchange for every other purpose,
while still allowing information to flow from an HRB to a healthcare provider.
A policy board will determine the approach for a number of issues that have yet to be
decided, including whether to have one consent form that would cover all (or most) use
cases, or multiple forms tailored to the type of electronic exchange service.

MA

Patient Rights and / or Durability of Consent: Patients may revoke their participation in
the exchange at any time. If they do so, the existing data in the exchange will remain, but
will be sequestered from further circulation unless required by law. Patients are also able to
alter their status in either direction (i.e., participate after previously opting out).
Type of Consent Model: Opt-In for the Massachusetts e-Health Collaborative (MAeHC).
Three pilot projects under MAeHC formally ended in December 2008, but MAeHC is
maintaining relationships with all participating providers through 2010, in order to allow
ongoing collection of performance and evaluation data. In addition, MAeHC gives
providers access to a community repository of clinical summaries.
The goal of the pilot project was to study and demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality
of implementing EHRs in community settings. As of November 2008, the patient opt-in
rate exceeded 90%.
MAeHC is one of four major HIOs in MA. The other three are the MA Health Data
Consortium (MHDC), the New England Healthcare Electronic Data Interchange Network
(NEHEN), and MA Simplifying Healthcare Among Regional Entities (MA-SHARE).
MA-SHARE is a major regional collaborative involving payers, providers, patients, and
employees in the state. MA-SHARE seeks to do the following:
1. Promote the inter-organizational exchange of healthcare data using information
technology, standards, and administrative simplification, in order to make
accurate clinical health information available wherever needed in an efficient,
cost-effective, and safe manner;
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2. Facilitate and incubate new projects exploring healthcare data connectivity in
order to develop, pilot, and demonstrate new healthcare information
technologies across communities and enterprises; and
3. Design technology solutions that assemble, organize and distribute a variety of
up-to-date clinical information to a broad range of clinical settings; all
accomplished in a secure, confidential manner.
Type of Information Exchanged: Data exchanged in the three MAeHC pilots include:
problems, procedures, allergies, medications, demographics, smoking status, diagnosis, lab
results, and radiology reports.
The MA-SHARE program contains a record locator service, medication histories in
emergency departments, e-prescription integration, and clinical messaging services.
As part of the MA-SHARE Push Pilot, discharge documents created by Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center, Children’s Hospital Boston, and emergency department systems
were routed over the new infrastructure to physicians and practices who have volunteered to
participate in the pilot.
Obtaining Data and / or Consent: A patient is given the option to participate in the
MAeHC when he / she visits a clinical entity for care, where he / she may opt in all clinical
data from each entity. The patient chooses which entity’s records to make available to the
network, and pre-defined data are then sent to the central server. Data are retrieved by the
physician, who views the data prior to or during the patient visit.

NY

In the opt-in model, a signed patient consent form is required for that patient’s clinical data
to be uploaded from his / her physician’s office EHR to the exchange’s community
database.
Type of Consent Model: Opt-In (NY refers to it as an “affirmative consent model”).
Consent is considered to be all or nothing, meaning that any data contributed to the
exchange could be made available (i.e., no ability to segment by data type).
Examples of NY RHIOs include: Long Island Patient Information Exchange (LIPIX),
HealtheLink (Buffalo), and Southern Tier Health Link (Binghamton) PCIP.
Type of Information Exchanged: State-level policies are broad so as to allow for
variation by region / HIO. As such, the type of data included in a given exchange varies
from one to another.
Obtaining Data and / or Consent: There are two approaches, depending on the RHIO:
1. The provider organization obtains consent at the point of service. For example, the
Brooklyn Health Information Exchange uses a “provider by provider” consent
process rather than a universal consent process for enrollment; and
2. The RHIO obtains consent through a RHIO multi-provider consent form, which can
be accessed either at the point of service or online via the RHIO website.
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Patient Rights and / or Durability of Consent: Patients have the ability to revoke their
participation in the exchange at any time. If they do so, the existing data in the exchange
will remain, but will be sequestered from further circulation unless required by law.
Other Related Details: The Primary Care Information Project, governed by the NYC
Health Department, contains extensive privacy safeguards. These safeguards include the
ability of a patient and doctor to see who has gained access to the records, and to lock
certain data behind a firewall so it can be seen only by the PCIP.

RI

According to the February 17, 2009 Appendix of the Public Governance Models Report,
there are 9 state-designated RHIOs in New York.
Type of Consent Model: Opt-In (Double). Consent for exchange participation is all or
nothing, so there is no granularity of choice with respect to the types of data that can flow
through the exchange. Once a patient has enrolled in the exchange, there are three options
for his / her participation:
1. All providers involved in care are permitted to access information (akin to HIPAA);
2. Only certain (selected by the patient) provider organizations (no segmentation at the
individual provider level) are authorized to access information; and
3. The default setting, in which providers have temporary access to information only in
an emergency or unanticipated event.
Type of Information Exchanged: RI is still in test mode, so no data are currently being
exchanged, but the near-term plans are for laboratory and medication history exchange.
Eventually, the hope is to exchange other types of data, including radiology reports and
discharge summary reports.
For the near future, the exchange will be used only to support treatment, including care
coordination. An advisory council will determine which, if any, additional purposes should
be added.
Obtaining Data and / or Consent: The RI Quality Institute (RIQI) has been training staff
in participating provider and other organizations (including ambulatory and inpatient care
settings, employers, community-based organizations, and long-term care facilities) how to
walk patients through the consent process.
To enroll, a patient completes an enrollment and authorization form for the exchange.
Patients can also enroll directly through the Current Care RI website, but will need to call a
hotline to indicate their provider preferences if they select participation option 2 (described
above).
To help offset the cost of administration, RI DHHS is paying a one-time, $3 authentication
fee for every participant enrolled.
Patient Rights and / or Durability of Consent: Patients have the ability to revoke their
participation in the exchange at any time. If they do so, the existing data in the exchange
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will remain, but will be sequestered from further circulation unless required by law.
For participants selecting the default option (described above as the third option),
information can only be accessed for up to 72 hours.
Other Related Details: All provider organizations submitting data to the exchange will
need to determine if the patient in question is currently participating in the RI exchange.
Due to provider reluctance to perform this function, the state is supporting development of a
technology solution that will reside (for now) with each contributing provider site. This
interface will look up participation status for patients before any information is shared
outside of the firewall.
Type of Consent Model: Opt-In for four HRB pilot programs. Three pilot program
locations are state-funded: Bellingham, Wenatchee, and Spokane. The pilot in Tacoma is
federally-funded (Madigan Army Medical Center in Fort Lewis, funded by the Department
of Defense).
HRBs implement a consumer-centric model. The consumer-centric model has instilled
some uncertainty among providers, who are concerned that patients would change or
misuse their health information in the HRB.
Type of Information Exchanged: Prescription data, allergies, laboratory results,
immunization records. Laboratory results, x-rays, and medication data are currently in the
repository.
Obtaining Data and / or Consent: Patients give consent for the HRB by creating their
own personalized account and then, using the HRB model, patients authorize the release of
their information to specific providers. Copies of a patient’s health information are
transferred into a patient’s HRB account like a deposit.
Patients who choose to participate use web-based tools like Microsoft HealthVault and
Google Health to store their personal health information in one location. The Google
software does not provide the same level of granularity as Microsoft. With Microsoft,
patients can choose what type of information providers can see, and can choose which
providers are allowed to view the information.
Currently, patients do not have the ability to input or alter their health information in the
bank. They can only view the information on the screen and print it out to share with
providers in hard-copy form.
Patient Rights and / or Durability of Consent: There is no time limit. A patient may
disenroll from the HRB at any point. If a patient decides to disenroll, the HRB offers a
window of time (30 – 90 days) during which the patient can change his / her mind and reenroll without losing valuable HRB data.
Because the HRB model is consumer-centric, the holders of data are released from HIPAA
issues (the HRB is obligated under ARRA to release a patient’s health information to him /
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her). HRBs also contain an audit function, which allows patients to find out when their
records are accessed.
Other Related Details: The Washington State Heath Care Authority plans to publish an
interim progress report on the pilot projects in the near future.
Type of Consent Model: Similar to IN, state laws in VA and TN do not require
affirmative consent from patients to share their general clinical information electronically
for treatment purposes (or other purposes expressly permitted under the law).
CareSpark is a non-profit regional health information exchange operating in a 34-county
area of East Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. At present, five provider entities
participate in the exchange:
1. Two ambulatory primary care practices;
2. One hospital system;
3. One payer; and
4. One public health agency.
As of mid-November 2009, there were 310,000 patients in the master patient index. Only a
subset of this population has data in the actual exchange because not all have had a clinical
encounter subsequent to receiving notice / opting-in.
The Carespark board of directors wanted to ensure that community members whose data
were to flow through the exchange would be well-educated about the process. As such, the
board established an opt-out with notice policy, meaning that no data are collected for
exchange until the patient is at least minimally educated about the exchange. In addition,
the board allowed individual provider organizations to adopt an opt-in protocol, meaning
that providers who choose to do so can require affirmative consent.
Currently, the information in the exchange is to be used for treatment only, but participants
understand that the goal is to be able to expand to public health, and eventually to other
approved research applications. Although not yet determined, the organization is leaning
toward having a blanket statement for consent on how information can be used for research
purposes, but with a supplemental patient consent form for specific studies that would
require IRB approval.
Type of Information Exchanged: At present, Carespark is only exchanging general
clinical information, which expressly excludes any type of information deemed sensitive
under either state’s laws. This issue is currently under consideration, however, so the board
may change this policy in the future. They do their best to ensure that sensitive information
is not shared by:
1. Restricting the participation of facilities that primarily serve patients with sensitive
conditions; and
2. Asserting that the provider is the one responsible for filtering data, and not allowing
such information to enter the exchange.
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Obtaining Data and / or Consent: Carespark has adopted a provider-centric approach to
patient education and, where applicable, consent. Based on some early research with
patients in the community, they learned that most stakeholders thought it would be best for
the provider to directly educate the patient.
Carespark has an employee who trains provider organizations, and also supplies them with
written and other educational materials that can be used during the notification process.
Most of the provider organizations use a paper form (either for notice or for consent) when
they first interface with the patient about the exchange.
To manage consent more broadly, they have built a custom software solution called Master
Patient Option Preference (MPOP). For every patient, a provider can enter a medical
record number into the system to see whether that person is has opted out (in which case
any clinical info found in the system should not be exchanged), or has either been notified
or opted in.
Patient Rights and / or Durability of Consent: The issue of durability of consent is left
to the provider’s discretion. If a patient participates and then later decides to opt out, his /
her information remains in the exchange, but will not flow.
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TABLE 2
State
DE

Selected State Laws
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 9920-22 (2010): Creates the Delaware Health Information
Network (DHIN) to “promote the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance of
facilities for public and private use of health care information in the State”; assigns
powers and duties to DHIN.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9926 (2010): Mandates that the Delaware Health Care
Commission shall, by rule or regulation, ensure that patient specific health information be
disclosed only to those having a need to know in accordance with the patient’s consent or
best interest. Any misuse of DHIN health information or data shall be reported to the
Office of the Attorney General, and is subject to prosecution and penalties under the
Delaware Criminal Code or federal law.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203 (2010):
1-100-102 DEL. CODE REGS. §§ 1.0-8.0 (2009): Provides the requirements of
participation in DHIN; specifies the obligations of business associates under HIPAA; and
specifies that patients shall be informed of and may choose to preclude a search of their
individual health information (opt-out) in the DHIN Interchange after consultation with
their health care provider.

IN

IND CODE ANN. §§ 5-31-3-1, 5-31-6-3 (West 2009): Establishes the Indiana Health
Informatics Corp. to assist in the development of a statewide HIE system. Specifies that
an HIE system must comply with HIPAA.

MA

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40J §§ 6D-G (West 2009): Establishes the E-Health
Institute Fund for the purpose of advancing the use of HIT in the Commonwealth.
Grantees receiving money from the Fund must:
 allow patients to opt-in to the health information network and opt-out at any time
 securely maintain identifiable health information
 provide individuals the option to receive a list of individuals who have accessed
their identifiable health information
 develop guidelines addressing the privacy and confidentiality of identifiable health
information

1

For a comprehensive review of state law requirements for patient permission to disclose health information, see
Pritts, J., et al., Privacy and Security Solutions for Interoperable Health Information Exchange: Report on State Law
Requirements for Patient Permission to Disclose Health Information, August 2009. Available at:
http://www.healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_10741_910326_0_0_18/DisclosureReport.pdf.
See also Purington, K., et al., “Electronic Release of Clinical Laboratory Results: A Review of State and Federal
Policy.” Prepared for: California HealthCare Foundation, January, 2010. Available at:
http://www.chcf.org/topics/view.cfm?itemid=134157.
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 report any unauthorized access or disclosure of patient health information
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 2 (West 2009): Effective January 1, 2015 the board of
registration for medicine, which licenses physicians, will require that all applicants be
competent in the use of computerized physician order entry, e-prescribing, EHRs and
other forms of HIT.

MD

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-143 (West 2009): Required the Maryland Health
Care Commission to designate a state HIE on or before Oct. 1, 2009. On or before
September 1, 2011, the Commission must adopt regulations that require State-regulated
payors to provide incentives to health care providers to promote the adoption and
meaningful use of EHRs. On or after the later of January 1, 2015 or the date established
for penalties under ARRA, health care providers must use EHRs that are certified by a
national certification organization designated by the Commission and capable of
connecting to and exchanging data with the HIE designated by the Commission in order
to qualify for incentive payments.

NV

NEV. REV. STAT. § 439.538 (2007): Allows individuals to opt out of the electronic
transmission of individually identifiable health information, except when required by
HIPAA or state law. Medicaid and CHIP recipients may not opt out. Exempts HIPAAcovered entities that electronically transmit individually identifiable health information in
compliance with HIPAA provisions from compliance with more stringent privacy or
confidentiality provisions under state law.

NY

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 18 (McKinney 2010): Requires that hospitals, physicians,
other health care providers, and HMOs obtain written consumer consent before disclosing
personal health information for non-emergency treatment. Requires patient consent even
in the case of treatment, payment, and health care operations.
New York courts analyzing Public Health Law, § 18 have required “any individual,
including government officials, who possess medical records to keep those records
confidential and not to release them to third parties without proper authorizations.”
Grosso v. Town of Clarkstown, No. 94 Civ. 7722(JGK), 1998 WL 566814, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 3, 1998); Caraveo v. Nielson Media Research, Inc., et al., No. 01 Civ. 9609
LBSRLE, 2003 WL 169767 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2003).
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530(23) (McKinney 2010): It is professional misconduct for
physicians, physician’s assistants, and specialist’s assistants to reveal personally
identifiable information obtained in a professional capacity to a third party without the
consent of a patient.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.1 (2009): Prohibits licensed professionals
from revealing “personally identifiable facts, data or information obtained in a
professional capacity without the prior consent of the patient or client, except as
authorized by law.”
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Disclosure of HIV- related information:
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 2010): Provides that confidential HIVrelated information shall not be disclosed (with exceptions for disclosures to a health care
provider or health facility when necessary to provide appropriate care or treatment to the
individual, a child of the individual, a contact of the individual, or a person authorized to
consent to health care for such contact).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 63.5(a) (2009): Provides that no confidential
HIV-related information shall be disclosed under a “general release,” but disclosure is
permitted under a “specific release” that has been approved by DOH
Disclosure of Mental Health Information:
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(d)–(f) (McKinney 2010): Permits disclosure of PHI
among mental hygiene law-licensed providers for treatment purposes without obtaining
patient consent, but disclosure is limited to that information necessary in light of the
reason for disclosure.
Additional State Laws
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 364–j-2 (McKinney 2010): Allows for providers who meet
certain standards set by DOH to receive supplemental payments for the increased cost of
the use of EHRs.
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 367–a (McKinney 2010): Allows the Office of Health
Information Technology Transformation to establish an EHR and electronic prescribing
program to award incentives to physicians and pharmacies who implement such
programs.

RI

Rhode Island Health Information Exchange Act of 2008, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-37.7-1
through 5-37.7-15 (2009): Establishes a statewide HIE under state authority and
specifies that the HIE will be opt-in, that is, patients and providers have the choice to
participate in the HIE (7-4). The act also specifies that authorization is not required for
release of information to public health authorities for a specified function, to health care
providers for diagnosis or treatment in an emergency, and to the RHIO for operation and
administrative oversight of the HIE (7-7). Additionally patients have the right to
terminate participation and will be able to obtain disclosure reports as well as notices of
security breaches (7-10).
Rules and Regulations Pertaining to the Regional Health Information Organization
and Health Information Exchange (effective Aug. 11, 2009) (not codified):
Promulgated pursuant to the authority conferred under R.I. Gen. Law § 5-37.7.
Establishes safeguards and confidentiality protections for Rhode Island’s HIE in order to
improve the quality, safety, and value of health care, keep confidential health information
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secure, and use the HIE to progress toward meeting public health goals. Provides that
confidential health information should only be accessed, released, or transferred from the
HIE in accordance with R.I. Gen. Law § 5-37.7, these Regulations, and any other
applicable state or federal law or regulation.

WA

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.05.031 (West 2009): Directs specific state agencies to
cooperate with the Washington State Health Care Authority in the establishment of health
care information systems.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.05.035 (West 2009): Establishes pilot of a consumercentric health information infrastructure and health record banks that will facilitate the
secure exchange of health information.

WI

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.82 (West 2009): Allows for the sharing of data with any health
care provider involved in the patient’s care without the informed consent of the patient.
Allows a provider to release a portion of a patient health care record to:
- Any person, if the patient or a person authorized by the patient agrees to the release
- Any of the following, if the patient and person authorized by the patient are
incapacitated or not physically available, if an emergency makes it impracticable to obtain
patient consent, and if the health care provider determines the release is in the patient’s
best interest:
 to a member of the patient’s immediate family, a relative, close personal
friend, or an individual identified by the patient; that portion of the record that
is directly relevant to the involvement of that person in the patient’s care
 to any person, that portion of the record that is necessary to identify, locate, or
notify a member of the patient’s immediate family or another person who is
responsible for the care of the patient concerning the patient’s location, general
condition, or death.
Exec. Order No. 303, Relating to the Governor’s WIRED for Health Board (Dec. 1,
2009):
Creates the Wisconsin Relay of Electronic Data for Health Board (WIRED) to lay the
groundwork for a statewide health data exchange. The Board must offer
recommendations for technical infrastructure, oversight, accountability, long-term
funding and common rules to protect patients by June 2010. The Board’s activities will
be funded by a $9.4 mil grant from the federal economic stimulus package.

GW SPHHS
Department of Health Policy

B-4

APPENDIX C

Select Examples of Exchange in Other Developed Countries
Canada
Canada is currently developing interoperable electronic exchange for its 32 million residents.
The system is being developed and funded primarily through Canada Health Infoway, a not-forprofit corporation whose members are the 14 federal, provincial, and territorial Deputy Ministers
of Health. 1 Infoway supports HIT development by way of strategic investments in local and
regional infrastructure projects. Specific consent policies are developed primarily at the
provincial level and are largely opt-out systems with granularity. 2 The federal government has
created a set of guidelines to promote further harmonization and development of consent policies
nationwide – the Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy and Confidentiality Framework 3 –
and is developing a nationwide system to track consent directives through the Consent Directive
Management Service. 4 Infoway plans to have fully interoperable EHRs for its entire population
by 2016. 5
In Canada, each of the 14 provinces is responsible for developing specific health privacy and
security provisions. Almost all provinces are pursuing an opt-out system with varying levels of
granularity, allowing implied consent to store and transmit health information for treatment
purposes (the sole exception is Quebec, which requires a patient’s express consent before sharing
information). 6 Many jurisdictions currently require that patients be informed that their health
information is being collected and how it may be used, as well as be given information regarding
the security safeguards in place to protect their data. This notice may be given at any time before
or at the time that the information is being collected, and can be given either directly by a
provider or by way of posters, brochures, websites, or other educational materials.7 It remains an
open question what, if any, additional consent provisions are needed for secondary uses of health
data, such as research and public health surveillance. 8

1

Canada Health Infoway. “2009-2010 Corporate Business plan,” at 4-5 [hereinafter “Business plan”]. Available at:
http://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/lang-en/about-infoway/about/annual-reports-and-business-plans.
2
Canada Health Infoway. “White Paper on Information Governance of the Interoperable Electronic Health Record,”
March, 2007 [hereinafter “White Paper”]. Available at: http://www2.infowayinforoute.ca/Documents/Information%20Governance%20Paper%20Final_20070328_EN.pdf.
3
Health Canada, “Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy and Confidentiality Framework,” January 27, 2005.
Available at: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/pubs/ehealth-esante/2005-pancanad-priv/index-eng.php.
4
Canada Health Infoway. “An Overview of the Electronic Health Record Privacy and Security Conceptual
Architecture,” March 2006, at 8 [hereinafter “Overview”].
5
Canada Health Infoway. “2015: Advancing Canada’s Next Generation of Health Care” [hereinafter “Advancing”].
Available at:
http://www.v1.theglobeandmail.com/partners/free/infoway/pdf/2015%20Health%20care%20full%20report%20EN.
pdf.
6
Pritts, J. and K. Conner. “The Implementation of E-consent Mechanisms in Three Countries: Canada, England, and
the Netherlands (the ability to mask or limit access to health data).” Prepared for: Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, HHS, February 16, 2007, at 17.
7
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Because Canadian privacy policy is set at both the federal and provincial levels, Infoway has
developed the Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy and Confidentiality Framework in order
to harmonize consent requirements. The framework specifies a set of core privacy principles
upon which provinces can develop consent requirements (as the framework itself is not legally
binding). These principles specify that the individual patient should be permitted to mask data
by content or provider, and have been endorsed by all provinces except for Quebec and
Saskatchewan. 9 Individual provinces are currently developing or updating their data
segmentation rules to allow for as much or more granularity as specified in the Pan-Canadian
Framework. 10 At present, many provinces permit highly granular consent options, allowing
individuals to mask discreet data elements in addition to categories of data.
As of the end of the 2009 fiscal year, Infoway had approved the allocation of $1.58 billion (out
of a total budget of $1.64 billion) toward 283 infrastructure projects undertaken at the provincial
and local levels for building core electronic exchange systems, including client and provider
registries, diagnostic imaging, drug and laboratory information systems, clinical reports, and
immunization records. As of March, 2009, these functionalities had been integrated into the
EHRs of 17 percent of Canadian citizens. 11 Originally, Infoway had aimed at extending these
basic functionalities to 50% of the population by 2010, but the organization recently
acknowledged that this timetable is unlikely to be met, and that EHR infrastructure development
remains highly varied among provinces. 12
Although Canadian privacy standards are set and health data is stored at the local and provincial
levels, a nationwide consent system – Consent Directive Management Services (CDMS) – is
being developed to obtain and track consent directives nationwide. Consent may be obtained
either electronically or at the point of service and stored within the national CDMS, while the
records themselves are maintained at the practitioner or regional level (depending on whether
there is an existing regional electronic exchange infrastructure in place). Consent data moves
through the system along with health information, and it is incumbent upon individual data
custodians to maintain data security and uphold consent directives in accordance with the rules
of the particular jurisdiction in which data is collected or received. 13 However, there remains
some uncertainty as to how consent directives are maintained between provinces with differing
granularity options. 14
The Netherlands
The Dutch National Healthcare Information Hub (LSP), currently being implemented by the
National Information and Communication Technology Institute for Healthcare (NICTIZ), is an
opt-out system with granularity built around remote information hubs connected to a national,
searchable database. This system, referred to as the “health care Google,” maintains patient
records at the practitioner or regional level (where regional electronic exchange already exists),
and makes them available through a searchable database accessible to eligible practitioners
9
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11
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throughout the country (i.e., those who meet a set of minimum security and functionality
requirements). 15 The country is currently debating whether to require all practices to connect to
the LSP. 16 While consent to share medical information is implied for treatment purposes,
patients have the option of segmenting data based on provider, care delivery setting, and data
type, and may even opt out of the exchange entirely. 17
The vast majority of practitioners in the Netherlands (97%) currently utilize EHRs in their
practice. 18 The goal of the NICTIZ is to link all practices to the central database in the near
future, although there has been delay due to many of the existing systems not meeting the LSP
security requirements. 19 At present, efforts are focused on nationwide implementation of two
“front-runner” functionalities – electronic medication lists and general practitioner’s summary
records. 20 Additional functionalities, such as acute care records and specialized systems chronic
disease management, are currently being developed by NICTIZ. 21
Within the Dutch LSP, citizens are identified by their Citizen Service Number (which functions
as an analog to U.S. Social Security numbers). 22 In order to participate in the LSP, a practitioner
must satisfy a set of security requirements. The individual practitioner is then connected to the
LSP through certified commercial entities known as Healthcare Service Providers, which act as
intermediaries between the provider and the hub and are responsible for tracking consent data
and maintaining data security. 23 The system allows the option of opting out of electronic
exchange entirely, as well as a high degree of granularity. All information is available for
treatment purposes only; private entities such as insurance companies and employers cannot
access the system. 24
Months before the LSP became operational in November, 2008, a form was sent to Dutch
citizens informing them of the system and giving them the choice to opt out. Some 330,000 (out
of 16.5 million residents) did so, leading to concern over the implementation strategy, which was
criticized for not adequately explaining the available granularity options and security measures in
15
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Schoen, C et al. “A Survey of Primary Care Physicians in Eleven Countries, 2009: Perspectives on Care, Costs,
and Experience.” Health Affairs Web Exclusive, 5 November 2009, 1171-1183, at 1175. Available at:
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/In%20the%20Literature/2009/Nov/1336_Schoen_su
rvey_primary_care_MDs_11_countries_HA_WebExcl_11052009_ITL_v2.pdf.
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place. 25 The system has also been criticized by both consumers and some physicians for not
providing adequate security and privacy protections. 26
Sweden
Sweden has recently started to implement a national health information exchange. In pursuance
of this goal, the Swedish Parliament passed the Patient Data Act on July 1, 2008. The law aims
to allow patients to decide who can access their medical record, while allowing care providers to
communicate permitted patient data in the exchange securely. 27 In Sweden, 100% of medical
records related to primary care services are digitized and 80 to 90% of those related to hospital
care services are digitized. 28 The focus of the new exchange (NPÖ) is to allow these records to
be shared between providers with appropriate patient consent to allow for increased preventive
health improvements and correct diagnosis. 29 The exchange will contain several “information
volumes,” including diagnoses, care services, medicines, care contacts, care documents, status,
care planning, and examination results. 30 It took one year after a contract was awarded for an
HIT company to establish the legal context, patient consent, and technological capability for the
system. These were completed on May 4, 2009. 31
To meet the goal of the legislation, the Swedish system uses an opt-in with restrictions consent
model. Sweden plans to place all digitized records on the central server for the exchange, but to
allow patients to decide which physicians will ultimately be able to access their records in the
database. A national level security database, “BIF,” was designed to parallel the new national
patient records system. This system will act as the authorization management service for secure
information-handling across organizations in the health care sector. A digital communication
system, “Sjunet,” ensures that doctors use a special electronic ID card to log in, and keeps track
of each instance that a health record is accessed. In order to view any healthcare record, health
care professionals must have a “patient relation” with the patient, meaning the patient has given
consent for them to look at his or her health record. Patients not only have the option of
restricting which professionals can access their record, they can also restrict the period of time
after the visit that the professional can continue to access it. Sweden also restricts health care
professionals on how much of the record they can see. However, county councils and
municipalities, not patients, designate which professionals can see which parts of the record.
The system has a “break the glass” provision that allows health care professionals to access the
record in an emergency, but the access will be logged and professionals will have to explain why
they needed to view the information. 32
The Swedish government began to implement this system in May 2009 on a trial basis within the
Municipality and County Council of Örebro. After evaluating its establishment and making
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appropriate changes, the government’s goal is to establish the system gradually in additional
counties and municipalities before extending it to the rest of the country. 33

33
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